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Abstract
Nowadays, the experimental study of emotional learning is commonly based on classical conditioning paradigms and models,
which have been thoroughly investigated in the last century. On the contrary, limited attention has been paid to the revaluation
of an unconditioned stimulus (UCS), which, as experimentally observed by various researchers in the last four decades, occurs
out of classical conditioning. For this reason, no analytical or quantitative theory has been developed for this phenomenon
and its dynamics. Unluckily, models based on classical conditioning are unable to explain or predict important psychophysi-
ological phenomena, such as the failure of the extinction of emotional responses in certain circumstances. In this manuscript
an analytical representation of UCS revaluation learning is developed; this allows us to identify the conditions determining
the “inextinguishability” (or resistant-to-extinction) property of emotional responses and reactions (such as those observed
in evaluative conditioning, in the nonreinforcement presentation of a conditioned inhibitor, in post-traumatic stress disorders
and in panic attacks). Furthermore, an analysis of the causal relation existing between classical conditioning and UCS reval-
uation is provided. Starting from this result, a theory of implicit emotional learning and a novel interpretation of classical
conditioning are derived. Moreover, we discuss how the proposed theory can lead to the development of new methodolo-
gies for the detection and the treatment of undesired or pathological emotional responses, and can inspire animal models for
resistant-to-extinction responses and reactions.
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Introduction
Emotions are critical for the environmental adaptation of in-
dividuals and for their survival. In fact, emotions prepare any
organism to act in some specific ways without the need of
experiencing a physical effect that originates from a specific
source of stimulation; for instance, the perception of a snake
evokes an innate reaction [1, 2, 3] before experiencing (or re-
experiencing) a physical elicitation (e.g., a snake attack). This
is due to the fact that the representation of some stimuli and
the associated emotional reactions are innate [1, 2, 3], being
shaped by evolution.
The emotional system plays also an important role in
many psychiatric and psychological diseases, in decision
making [4] and in the clinical field (e.g., in drug treatment;
[5, 6, 7, 8, 9]). Moreover, experimental evidence suggests
that subliminal emotional stimulation (through emotional pic-
tures) can improve sport or endurance performance [10, 11],
and that emotions influence pain perception [12, 13, 14]. This
leads to the conclusion that any influence at emotional level
may substantially affect human behavior and perception.
Nowadays, the experimental study of emotions and of their
related phenomena is usually based on classical conditioning
paradigms [15]. Classical conditioning occurs when a condi-
tioned stimulus (CS) is paired with an unconditioned stimulus
(UCS). Generally speaking, a CS is a neutral/innocuous stim-
ulus (e.g., a sound or a neutral visual cue), whereas the asso-
ciated UCS is a source of stimulation (e.g., an electric shock
or food). By repeated CS-UCS pairings, a CS can come to
elicit a conditioned response (CR), which is often similar to
the unconditioned response (UCR), i.e. to the response di-
rectly elicited by the paired UCS [16, 17, 15]; however, the
repetitive presentation of the CS without that of the paired
UCS leads to CR extinction, since the CS itself will not be
longer able to signal (or predict) the UCS.
Classical conditioning theory provides an explanation of
the emotional learning mechanism involved in repeated CS-
UCS pairings. However, this is not the only emotional learn-
ing mechanism, as originally understood by [18]. In fact,
Rescorla noticed the difference between the learning mech-
anisms involving two independent emotional memories, one
concerning CS-UCS pairing, the other one the UCS out-
come evaluation (and re-evaluation). This viewpoint has been
shared by other researchers (e.g., see [19, 20, 21, 22]). How-
ever, as far as we know, until now no mathematical (or quanti-
tative) model has been developed for the second type of emo-
tional learning, i.e. for UCS revaluation (in other words,
for the learning and the re-valuation of an UCS outcome).
For this reason, no quantitative description can be given for
many psychophysiological effects and phenomena driven by
the emotional system. In fact, this requires the knowledge of
a model able to porperly describe the dynamics of the inter-
actions between the emotional system and a primary stimulus
(i.e., an UCS).
In this manuscript we tackle the problems of developing a
novel theory and a new model for implicit emotional learning;
we also lay foundations for the development of new meth-
ods for the modulation of emotional reactive responses. Our
solutions to the above mentioned problems are based on the
analysis and the interpretation of various experimental results
acquired in different disciplines. In fact, we propose a uni-
fying framework that provides a comprehensive and coherent
description of the emotional learning system.
The article begins by illustrating a multidimensional rep-
resentation of the emotional response to a given stimulus.
The proposed representation, which is supported by experi-
mental evidence showing the involvement of distinct and spe-
cific neuronal populations in emotional responses [23, 24]
(and is also supported by other experimental results based
on pharmacological conditioning [25, 26, 27]), accounts for
the different types of emotional response and, in particular,
for active responses (which are actively sustained by exter-
nal physical mechanisms, like pharmacological or mechani-
cal stimulation), reactive responses (which are not sustained
by any physical mechanism, but “self-instantiated” by the
emotional system) and passive residual responses (due to
the excitatory residuals from previous emotional elicitations;
[28, 29]). Moreover, in our representation plays an impor-
tant role the source attribution and misattribution phenom-
ena [30, 31, 32, 33, 34] and the modeling of contrast effects
[35]. We then develop a novel model describing the emotional
response of an organism elicited by a source of stimulation
(i.e., an UCS). The derivation of our model relies on the as-
sumption that, similarly as various mathematical models de-
scribing classical conditioning (e.g., Rescorla-Wagner model
[36, 37] or temporal difference (TD) models [38, 39, 40, 41]),
or probabilistic (Bayesian) “perception” and “action” learning
models (i.e., the predictive coding (PC) [42] and the active
inference models [43, 44]), coding of emotional and behav-
ioral responses involves the computation of a specific error-
signal. In our work this error signal is defined as the dif-
ference between the response expected from the considered
source of stimulation and the response actually perceived by
the elicited organism. This definition is equivalent to that
adopted in TD and PC models, and relies on experimental ob-
servations acquired in functional imaging studies [45, 38, 46],
or directly measured in dopaminergic circuits (e.g., in the
ventral tegmental area, VTA) or in other fear-related circuits
[47, 48, 49, 50, 23, 51, 24, 52, 53]. The relationship be-
tween the mechanisms of classical conditioning learning and
that of UCS revaluation learning is taken into consideration
next. In particular, we analyse the different mechanisms in-
volved in the encoding of a CS and of an UCS, and show
how the two resulting neural representations lead to specific
different properties. Furthermore, we show that a) what is ob-
served during classical conditioning is actually an interrelated
effect of both associative and UCS revaluation learning mech-
anisms, b) only the latter is driven by the emotional system
through the computation of emotional error signals (this im-
portant result is supported by experimental evidence obtained
from optogenetic manipulations [54, 55]). After showing how
the Rescorla-Wagner equation for classical conditioning can
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be analitically derived from the proposed model for implicit
emotional learning under specific conditions, we propose a
more complete model for Pavlovian conditioning; in doing so,
the stochastic Hebbian plasticity rule [56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61]
is exploited. The proposed model is able to predict specific
phenomena which cannot be explained by the currently avail-
able classical conditioning models (such as the dependence
of asymptotic responding on CS intensity and US intensity;
[36, 62]). Furthermore, we discuss how the conditioned inhi-
bition [63] and some related phenomena (such as the failure
of the extinction of conditioned inhibition through nonrein-
forced presentations of the inhibitor; [64, 65]), which cannot
be described in terms of classical conditioning [65, 36], can
be quantitatively predicted by the proposed theory. Then, we
analyse the case in which the emotional system is elicited by
a continuous time-varying source of stimulation (e.g., a time-
varying acoustic stimulation, such as music; [66]), and we
show how our model can be extended to provide some math-
ematical and neurophysiological indications. Our model is
then exploited to quantitatively describe some (system-level)
mechanisms leading to a resistance-to-extinction of an emo-
tional response (i.e., inextinguishability over successive tri-
als or over time) under certain conditions, and to illustrate
some mechanisms through which an emotional reactive re-
sponse associated with a primary stimulus can be artificially
strengthened/mitigated. This provides new insights on vari-
ous psychiatric pathologies, like panic attacks [67], post trau-
matic stress disorder (PTSD; e.g., see [68, 69, 70]), and
psychological phenomena like evaluative conditioning (EC)
[71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 33, 80, 81] (which are
known to be resistant to extinction [72, 33]).
Finally, we summarise our main findings and discuss the
potential implications of our results on future research on
emotion processing.
Methods
1. Response representation
This Section is organized as follows. In Section 1.1 the
emotional and non-emotional components of the central ner-
vous system (CNS) response to a given stimulus are analysed
and vector representations for such a response are developed.
Then, in Section 1.2 the active and reactive components of an
emotional response are introduced. Finally, the specific fea-
tures of the reactive response are discussed in Section 1.3.
1.1. Components and vector representation of a brain re-
sponse
Generally speaking, in a mammalian CNS the response
(i.e., the effect) elicited by a given stimulus consists of dis-
tinct components, each involving a multitude of neuronal and
receptor families; this response (or effect) can be determined
by hormonal, mechanical, acoustic, pharmacological and/or
other effects originating from the peripherical systems or from
the CNS itself. In the following each component of a CNS re-
sponse is associated with a specific neuronal (e.g., dopaminer-
gic, serotonergic, opiodergic, etc.) population within a given
brain region (e.g., the population of dopaminergic neurons in
the ventral tegmental area, VTA). For this reason, if N dis-
tinct components can be identified in the CNS, the considered
response can be represented as a row vector y= [y1,y2, ...,yN ]
belonging to a N-dimensional space, called CNS space in
the following; moreover, this vector can be expressed as
the linear combination of N versors (i.e., unit norm vectors)
{vi; i = 1,2, ...,N}; this set of versors, being associated with
different neuronal populations, form a complete basis B for
the considered space. Then, we have that
y =
N
∑
i=1
yivi, (1)
where yi is a real quantity representing the product between
the mean number of elicited neurons and their mean firing
rates for the i-th neuronal population (with i = 1,2, ...,N);
consequently, yi takes on a positive (negative) value if the
response produces an increase of (a decrease or inhibition
of) the activity for the i-th population, and is equal to zero
whenever the response does not involve any adjustment for
the baseline activity of the population. It is also important
to point out that, generally speaking, the versors forming the
basis B are not orthogonal, since a specific component can
be (linearly or non-linearly, and directly or indirectly) re-
lated with other components. This fact is exemplified by the
dopaminergic nigrostriatal population (associated with motor
functions) and the dopaminergic neurons within the mesolim-
bic system (associated with motivation and reward functions);
in fact, these populations are not simply differentiated from an
anatomic viewpoint and significant functional interactions be-
tween them have been observed (e.g., see [82] and references
therein). Furthermore, given a specific region, a neuronal
population can influence another population (e.g., the nora-
drenergic neuronal population can interact with the dopamine
neurons [83]). From a neurochemical perspective, the motiva-
tion for the interdependencies between different components
is represented by the fact that a given neurotransmitter may
simultaneously interact with all the various isoforms of its re-
ceptor on neurons that also are under the influence of multiple
other afferent pathways and their transmitters [84].
The components forming the response elicited by a given
stimulus can be classified on the basis of different criteria.
A fundamental criterion consists in distinguishing emotional
components from non-emotional ones. In practice, the emo-
tional component of a given response is due to all the emo-
tional and motivational neuronal systems and influences the
mesocortical limbic structures contributing to approach and
avoidance behaviors [85]. On the contrary, the non-emotional
components originate from all the neuronal systems not be-
longing to the emotional/motivational systems (e.g., to the ni-
grostriatal dopaminergic system or the sensorimotor system).
Note that, generally speaking, emotional and non-emotional
components can be interdependent; for instance, they can be
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Figure 1: Bidimensional representation of the CNS space and the emotional
sub-space. A generic elicited response in the CNS space is also sketched.
causally related (e.g., physical and emotional pains are corre-
lated) or indirectly related (e.g., emotional components can
influence the immune response [86, 5, 87, 88, 89]). This
differentiation between emotional and non-emotional compo-
nents can be included in the vector model sketched above by
identifying an emotional sub-space within the CNS space, as
exemplified by Fig. 1.
Furthermore, the emotional (non-emotional) response com-
ponents are collected in the vector yem (yne) and overall CNS
can be represented as the concatenation of the two aforemen-
tioned vectors, i.e. as
y = [yem,yne]. (2)
Finally, it is worth noting that our response representa-
tion is suited to properly model various experimental re-
sults evidencing that the mammalian CNS is able to discrim-
inate different emotional rewarding components (e.g., differ-
ent dopaminergic populations related to appetitive or reward-
ing stimulations). In particular, some results illustrated in
[23, 24] have lead to the conclusion that neurons can dis-
criminate between cocaine and liquid rewards (or between
cocaine and heroin), possibly even better than between nat-
ural rewards, and that in rats some neurons can be activated
by lever pressing regardless of drug injection, whereas other
neurons by pressing a lever of a specific drug or natural re-
wards only. This shows that every external stimulus, such as
food, a natural liquid reward or a rewarding drug, is able to
elicit in the rat CNS some specific emotional components re-
lated to specific neuronal populations.
1.2. Active and reactive emotional responses
In this manuscript the following definitions are adopted in
relation to a source of emotional stimulation.
Definition 1. Source of emotional stimulation
An emotional source of stimulation is defined as any source
or primary stimulus able to elicit a response involving an emo-
tional or motivational component.
Note that the term “primary stimulus” is employed here to
exclude any secondary stimulus (i.e., CS [15, 37]) conditioned
to a source stimulus through classical conditioning; neverthe-
less, even a CS previously paired with a primary stimulus (i.e.,
an UCS) is able to elicit an emotional response. In the follow-
ing we assume that a given UCS is always able to elicit an
emotional component (e.g., an electric shock device or food),
so that both the terms UCS and emotional source of stimula-
tion could be used indiscriminately.
Definition 2. Active stimulation and active response
An active emotional response is defined as any emotional
component elicited by a primary stimulus through direct phys-
ical (e.g. mechanical, chemical, pharmacological, etc.) mech-
anisms. Furthermore, the stimulus elicitation is defined as ac-
tive stimulation.
It is worth mentioning that the adjective “active” refers to
the fact that the considered response is substained through an
active and physical action of the considered external source of
stimulation.
Real world examples of a stimulus eliciting an active re-
sponse are provided by a drug able to stimulate an emotional
or motivational component (through pharmacological mech-
anisms), a pain stimulus (originating, for instance, from an
electric shock delivery), or food.
Generally speaking, the active response can be represented
as a non-linear and time-varying function of the physical stim-
ulation generating it and of the internal physiological states
(note that the time-variance of this function accounts, for in-
stance, for habituation effect or for receptor upregulation and
downregulation [84]). Moreover, the active response may be
influenced by various physical features of the source stimu-
lus, such as its frequency, rate of change and magnitude of the
elicitation.
Definition 3. Reactive stimulation and reactive response
A reactive emotional response (or non-active response) is
defined as any emotional component “self-induced” by the
perception of a stimulus; such a response is not actively sus-
tained by any external physical (e.g. mechanical, chemical,
pharmacological, etc.) mechanism. Furthermore, the stimu-
lus elicitation is defined as reactive stimulation.
It is worth noting that the adjective “reactive” refers to the
fact that the considered response is reactively eicited as the
stimulus is perceived and it is not substained through any di-
rect physical mechanism.
A real word example of a stimulus eliciting a reactive re-
sponse is provided by a CS previously paired with a primary
stimulus; in this case the elicited reactive response is called
coditioned reflex [15]. The non-active response can be elicited
also through the mere perception of a primary source of stimu-
lation, such as a threatening stimulus (e.g. a spider or a snake)
or food. Such a source of stimulation could be innate (e.g.,
represented by a biological/phylogenetic fear-related threat,
such as a spider, a snake or an angry face [1, 2, 90]) or learned
(e.g., an ontogenetic source like a gun [1]).
It is important to point out that, from an evolutionary per-
spective, emotional reactive responses are fundamental for
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the survival of individuals since they can elicit behavioral
responses without the need for individuals to phisically re-
experiencing a given source elicitation (e.g., a snake bite),
or they act to turn individual attention to positive valenced
sources, such as food. For this reason, reactive responses
are learned through the emotional system in order to induce a
proper reaction whenever individuals face sources of stimula-
tion or other cues signalling a primary stimulus. As it will be
discussed in more detail in Section 2.1, reactive responses are
elicited through the amygdala, since, in the absence of an in-
tact amygdala, no reactive response or conditioned reflex can
occur [91]. It is also worth mentioning that a primary stimulus
is able to elicit both an active emotional response and a reac-
tive emotional response; on the contrary a secondary stimulus
(i.e., a CS) can elicit a reactive response only.
Given the definitions and the considerations illustrated
above, the emotional vector yem can be expressed as
yem = yaem+yrem (3)
where yaem (yrem) represents the active (reactive) portion of
yem.
In the literature various results are available about the la-
tency and decay of emotional responses. First of all, the
latency of an emotional response is usually deemed negligi-
ble; however, its decay is a time-consuming process for all
nontrivial or pronunced emotional states [31, 92, 93, 28]. In
analysing the decay of a response, it should be always kept
into account that any emotional response can be decomposed
in two main functional factors, namely the dominantly neu-
rally controlled factor and the dominantly humorally con-
trolled factor. The former factor has a faster decay after the
end of the stimulation, whereas the latter one is relatively
slower [28] and can elicit neural responses. For this reason,
the different factors of both reactive and active responses ex-
tinguish after their elicitation at different speeds. For this rea-
son, it can be always assumed that at least a portion of both
active and reactive responses extinguishes quite slowly (e.g.,
this portion is related to hormones and neuromodulators de-
cay). Moreover, at a given instant a generic active or reactive
response can be in its active state (e.g., instantiated, or dur-
ing an active elicitation) or in its passive state (i.e., during the
decay interval following the end of an active elicitation).
The most important ideas illustrated in this Section can be
summarized in Fig. 2, which shows the different types of the
emotional response that can be elicited by a generic source of
stimulation and the mathematical notation adopted to denote
them.
1.3. On the nature of reactive emotional responses
As already stated in the previous Section, a generic CS can
elicit a reactive emotional response only, unless it also rep-
resents a primary source of stimulation. For this reason, the
observation of the responses elicited by different CSs can un-
veil the specific properties of reactive responses. Various re-
sults are already available about this issue in the literature.
In particular, it is well known that the unconscious/implicit
placebo/nocebo effect can be interpreted as a conditioning
process in which a primary stimulus (e.g., a drug) become
paired with a CS (e.g., the substance administration or other
cues) [5, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 8, 103]. Af-
ter some effective pairings, a successive presentation of the
CS (e.g., the administration of an inerte substance), in the ab-
sence of any active physical/pharmachological stimulation, is
able to elicit a purely reactive response which mimics the pre-
vious active response due to the primary stimulus. This claim
is confirmed by various brain imaging data, evidencing that
placebos can mimic the effect of active drugs and activate the
same brain areas; this occurs for placebo-dopamine in Parkin-
son’s disease, for placebo-analgesics or antidepressants, and
for placebo-caffeine in healthy subjects (see [27] and refer-
ences therein). Moreover, in [25] it is shown that pharma-
cological conditioning, like conditioning with opioids, pro-
duces placebo analgesia mediated via opioid receptors ad-
ministering saline infusions, and that, if conditioning is per-
formed with nonopioid drugs, other nonopioid mechanisms
are involved, so that conditioning activates the same specific
neuronal populations as the primary stimulus. Similar results
and conclusions have been obtained in mice experiments [26].
This line of reasoning is also supported by a further experi-
ment [104] showing that an increase in dopamine release in
the ventral striatum, measured through microdialysis, are ob-
served not only when rats self administer cocaine (represent-
ing the UCS in the considered experiment), but also when they
are solely presented with a tone (representing the CS) that has
been previously paired with cocaine administration. Further-
more, experimental verification of the influence of noncon-
scious conditioned stimuli on placebo/nocebo effects [98, 99]
show that a reactive stimulus is able to interfere with a given
active stimulation (e.g., an active drug or a painful stimula-
tion), by increasing or decreasing the effect of the active re-
sponse. This suggests that common active and reactive re-
sponse components can be additive or competing and, hence,
both contribute to the determination of the overall elicited re-
sponse. The last observation is also supported by further ex-
perimental results [12, 13, 14] which show that emotional re-
active stimulations (e.g., the perception of emotional pictures
or other reactive stimuli) modulate pain perception. For these
reasons, if the active and the reactive elicited responses in-
volve some common components, these, in turn, add up in
an algebraic sense (see Eqs. (3) and (1)). A further support
of this conclusion come from the experimental evidences de-
scribed in [31, 92, 28, 29] which show that, under some con-
ditions, an emotional excitation can be transferred to a succes-
sive independent source of stimulation, energizing it, because
of the residual excitation due to the incomplete decay of the
previous emotional elicitation. This phenomenon is called ex-
citation transfer [28, 29].
Additional results illustrated in [105] reveal the differenti-
ation between emotional and non-emotional components, and
reactive and active responses in nociceptive stimulation (in
this case the pain network involves both affective or emotional
components, and sensory components). In particular, func-
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Figure 2: Representation of the different types of CNS response elicited by a generic source of stimulation.
tional imaging experiments have evidenced that both phys-
ically receiving a pain stimulus (i.e., an active stimulation)
or observing a signal indicating that a loved person - present
in the same room - is receiving a similar pain stimulus (i.e.,
a reactive emotional pain-related stimulus mediated through
empathy) activates the bilateral anterior insula (AI), the ros-
tral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the brainstem and and
the cerebellum. These results have also shown that, on the
contrary, activity in the posterior insula/secondary somatosen-
sory cortex, the sensorimotor cortex (SI/MI), and the caudal
ACC was specific to physically receiving pain (i.e., that non-
emotional components were exclusively due to the active re-
sponse) [105].
All the results mentioned above evidence that a CS (or a
generic reactive stimulus) can elicit specific neural popula-
tions and that these populations reflect or mimic the same sys-
tems elicited by the primary stimulus paired with the condi-
tioned CS; in other words, as far as the emotional components
are concerned, a reactive response mimics the original ac-
tive response. Moreover, active and reactive responses which
involve the same emotional components add up in algebraic
sense. This observation leads us to the following two impor-
tant remarks:
Remark 4.
A reactive response can mimic, at least, the emotional sub-
space of a previously associated elicited active response.
Nonetheless, we argue that a reactive response can cer-
tainly determine also some non-emotional components pro-
vided that these are causally related to the emotional ones
(e.g., the emotional system can influence the immune re-
sponse [86, 5, 87, 88, 89], or the dopaminergic mesolimbic
system can interact with the nigrostriatal dopaminergic sys-
tem [106, 107, 82]). Furthermore, we argue that even the hu-
moral immune response sub-space (in particular the compo-
nents of the CNS such as the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal
axis, HPA, or the sympathetic nervous system, SNS; [87]),
other than the emotional sub-space, can be mimicked from an
active response elicitation; this last assertion is supported by
experimental results related to conditioned immune response
and pharmacological conditioning with immunosuppressive
drugs [5, 87, 108]. Note also that Remark 4 is fundamental
on the description of the emotional dynamics (see Section 3).
Remark 5.
If a reactive and an active responses involve the same com-
ponents, the reactive response can strenghten/weaken (ener-
gize/inhibit) the emotional components of the primary ac-
tive response since they are qualitatively indistinguishable.
Hence, Eq. (3) can be applied.
As it will become clearer in Section 3, this remark will play
a fundamental role in the description of emotional dynamics.
One can argue that, in some cases, a reactive response
learned from its active counterpart does not mimic the orig-
inal emotional response. For instance, this occurs in aversive
conditioning, when an electric shock is used as unconditioned
stimulus; in particular, it has been observed that heart rate
decreases during the presentation of a CS and, on the con-
trary, it increases when an active electric shock is given [109].
For this reason, at first glance reactive and active responses
seem to be qualitatively different as they lead to distinct be-
haviors. Actually, a different interpretation of these results
can be formulated. In fact, it should not be forgotten that the
active response to a pain stimulus consists of two components
(one emotional, the other one non-emotional) and the non-
emotional component could result in a behavior substantially
different than that produced by the elicitation of the emotional
component alone. Moreover, generally speaking, in the com-
plex mammalian CNS, different level of a specific neurotrans-
mitter within a given brain region (determined by the elicita-
tion of a specific emotional component) could lead to different
(even opposite) behavioral observations [84] (this last asser-
tion will be discussed in more detail in Section 6.2).
2. Error-driven learning
In this Section the basic mechanisms involved in emo-
tional learning are reviewed; in particular we focus on the
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role played by the amygdala (and other important systems) in
emotional learning and on the mechanisms for the generation
of the error signals on which such a learning is based.
2.1. On the role of the amygdala in emotional learning
In complex vertebrates the amygdala represents the core
center in the formation and storage of emotional events and in
the elicitation of emotional responses. In particular, it is well
known that the amygdala plays a fundamental role in encod-
ing emotional memories, in fear responses and in skin conduc-
tance response (SCR) classical conditioning. In fact, various
results are available in the literature about the involvement
of the amygdala in the acquisition and encoding of relevant
emotional memories [110, 111, 112, 113, 114], and about the
fact that these mechanisms are based on its synaptic plastic-
ity [115, 112, 116]. In addition, in a growing body of liter-
ature [117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122] it is shown that amyg-
dala is necessary for fear responses, and no reactive fear re-
sponses are instantiated in the absence of an intact amygdala
[118]. Finally, the analysis of patients with a damaged brain
has evidenced the importance of amygdala in SCR classical
conditioning. This emerges, for instance, from the results il-
lustrated in [91], where the case of a patient with selective
bilateral destruction of his amygdala is analysed; in fact, this
patient shows an unconditioned SCR to a UCS, but no SCR
conditioning to the paired CS, although he is well aware of
the CS-UCS relation.
All the results illustrated above lead to the conclusion that
the amygdala is necessary for the elicitation of an emotional
reactive response; note, however, that, if the amygdala is
damaged, an active elicited response (e.g., an unconditioned
painful stimulus) can be still elicited. Further results available
in the literature evidence that the amygdala mediates the emo-
tional reaction, and that directly and indirectly elicits emo-
tional and motivational areas of human brain [123, 54, 124].
In particular, on the basis of information coming from the sub-
cortical (i.e. thalamus) and cortical pathways (from which
perception and the representation of the features of any source
originates) the amygdala arouses both the cortex and the emo-
tional and motivational brain regions directly and indirectly
through different systems [125, 126], that is the nucleus ac-
cumbens (NAcc), the prefrontal cortex, the midbrain, the hy-
pothalamus, the autonomic nervous system, the endocrine
system and others). In the following analysis we briefly re-
fer to this group of systems as system chain. In fact, the
amygdala sends projections to a variety of systems, and it con-
sists of several interacting subnuclei that may provide specific
individual contribution to the overall emotional computation
[127, 126, 125] (in particular, different subnuclei of the amyg-
dala can process and elicit specific emotional components
[128, 129, 130, 54, 127]). Research activities in this field
have also evidenced that that the representation of any UCS is
stored within the basolateral amygdala (BLA) [54, 55]. Note
also that the amygdala mediates both appetitive (i.e. reward-
ing) and aversive stimuli [117, 54, 131, 120, 121, 122, 132];
in the former case the BLA neurons project onto the NAcc,
whereas in the latter one onto the centromedial amygdala
(CeM) [112].
2.2. On the generation of error signals in emotional learning
Neurons in several brain structures appear to code specific
signals, that are called error signals and, generally speak-
ing, represent the difference between a really experienced re-
sponse and its expected counterpart [51, 24]. In the literature
a number of results are available about the role played by spe-
cific neuronal populations in coding error signals and the na-
ture of such signals. In particular the error signals are coded in
relation to rewards, punishments, external stimuli, and behav-
ioral reactions [48, 51, 53]. In some cases, dopamine neurons,
norepinephrine neurons, and nucleus basalis neurons broad-
cast prediction errors as teaching signals to large postsynap-
tic structures; in other cases, error signals are coded by se-
lected neurons in the cerebellum, superior colliculus, frontal
eye fields, parietal cortex, striatum, and visual system, where
they influence specific subgroups of neurons. In general, pre-
diction errors can be used in postsynaptic structures for the
immediate selection of behavior or for synaptic changes un-
derlying emotional and behavioral learning [46, 51]. Evi-
dences of coding of error signals during learning have been
found in various neuroimaging studies [45, 38, 46].
More specifically, as evidenced by a growing body of liter-
ature [133, 48, 134, 23, 24, 53], in emotional learning, popu-
lations of dopaminergic neurons encode the error signal eval-
uating the difference between what is expected (i.e., the ex-
pected reward) and what is really occuring; furthermore, this
error signal is exploited to correct and modulate the individ-
ual’s emotional and behavioral response. The error signal
computed in these dopaminergic regions can be positive or
negative and can drive appetitive or aversive emotional reac-
tions [48].
On the basis of all the above illustrated results, it can be
stated that error signals driving emotional responses are eval-
uated in different brain regions, depending on the nature of
the involved emotional components; however, in emotional
learning (and in the computation of the associated error sig-
nal), a fundamental role is played by the orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC) [135], which represents a key structure in coding and
maintaining the representations of a stimulus response (i.e.,
the representation of the expected outcome associated with
a stimulus) [136, 135]. In fact, various experimental results
have evidenced that the OFC generates information about
expected outcomes (e.g., see [137] and references therein),
which are demeed critical in the computation of prediction
errors; these results are consistent with the relation between
the reward-related activity in OFC and VTA dopamine neu-
rons [137]. Experimental results have also evidenced that,
when OFC and midbrain data are juxtaposed, anticipatory ac-
tivity observed in the OFC is inversely related to dopamin-
ergic error signaling downstream [138]. This suggests that
the error signals in other brain areas might depend partly on
OFC input for properly calculating the errors [139, 138]. This
idea has been partially confirmed for error signals in midbrain
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dopamine neurons (at least in rats; see [140]). The OFC re-
gion has been also shown to respond to both appetitive and
aversive outcomes [141], to integrate multiple sources of in-
formation regarding outcome signals, to code outcomes and
supervise the amygdala (which, as already explained in the
previous Section, is the key element for both positive and
negative-valence emotions) [142, 143, 144], and to integrate
cognitive information [145] (also coming from the dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex [146]) in its evaluation and coding of
emotional outcomes [135]. Finally, it is worth pointing out
that OFC is not necessary for Pavlovian conditioning, since
this can be driven by prior experience; however, it is certainly
needed for modifying the response if the predicted outcome is
revaluated (i.e., UCS inflation and devaluation) [138, 147].
2.3. On error-based emotional learning
On the basis of the experimental results summarised in the
previous Section, it can be assumed that, during emotional
learning, an error signal is computed in different brain re-
gions (e.g., the VTA), depending on the nature of the elicited
emotional response. In this process the OFC plays an im-
portant role since it interacts with these brain regions and
codes the expected response to a given stimulus (i.e., the ex-
pected UCR). Moreover, the error signal which is broadcasted
to other brain regions including the OFC, may undergo pro-
cessing and fusion with other information (even at a higher
cognitive level) and is certainly sent to the amygdala, since
this part of the brain is necessary for the elicitation of an emo-
tional reactive response, for conditioning and for the storing
process of emotional stimuli.
It is also important to point out that the extended network
for computing and coding the emotional error-signals (which
we call error computing distributed network) can be repre-
sented as a distributed system consisting of different sub-
systems and, in particular, the OFC, the prefrontal cortex
(PFC), the VTA, the midbrain, the striatum and others; all
these interact in an iterative fashion. However, the study of
these multiple neural interactions is behind the scope of our
analysis. For this reason, in the following we assume that,
whenever a stimulus elicits an emotional response, an error
signal is computed and transmitted to the amygdala for up-
dating the corresponding reactive emotional response; note
that this error-driven mechanism ensures adaptivity in emo-
tional learning. As it will be shown in the following sections,
this mechanism can be quantitatively described and analysed
by representing the emotional learning system as a dynamic
system, characterised by memory elements (due to the amyg-
dala and to the OFC), fed by a time-variyng error signal, and
generating the emotional responses (i.e., the vector yem in Eq.
(3)).
It is useful to mention that the ideas of relating brain learn-
ing to an error-prediction signal and of modelling this pro-
cess as a dynamic adaptive control system have been already
developed in various theories. The most relevant example of
this approach is provided by Rescorla and Wagner in their
theory about classical conditioning. In fact, in this case the
human brain is assumed to learn from a prediction error, de-
fined as the discrepancy between a reference value and what
is actually perceived by the considered subject [36, 37]. In
particular, learning occurs through a mechanism that updates
the expectations about the outcome in proportion to a predic-
tion error, so that, across trials, the expected outcome con-
verges to the actual outcome [37]. A variant of the Rescorla-
Wagner theory is represented by the so called temporal differ-
ence (TD) learning [38, 39, 40, 41], which accounts for the
time evolution of the response within each trial. The goal of
TD learning is providing a prediction, for each instant t in the
trial during which a CS is presented, of the total future reward
to be gained in that trial from time t to the end of the trial itself
[38].
A more recent theory (known as predictive coding theory
[42]) formalizes the notion of the Bayesian brain, in which
neural representations in the higher levels of cortical hierar-
chies generate predictions of representations in lower levels.
These top-down predictions are compared with representa-
tions at the lower level to compute a prediction error. The
resulting error-signal is passed back up the hierarchy to up-
date higher representations; this recursive exchange of sig-
nals lead to the minimization (ideally the suppression) of the
prediction error at each and every level to provide a hierar-
chical explanation for sensory inputs that enter at the low-
est (sensory) level. In the Bayesian jargon neuronal activity
encodes beliefs or probability distributions over states in the
world that causes sensations [42]. In predictive coding the-
ory the notion of precision (or confidence, which is the in-
verse of the variance) of the error signals is also formalised,
and the mechanism through which the brain has to estimate
and encode the precision associated with the prediction errors
is explained. The prediction errors are then weighted with
their precision before being assimilated at a high hierarchi-
cal level. Generally speaking, predictive coding assumes that
organisms minimize an upper bound on the entropy of sen-
sory signals (the free energy), which, under certain simpli-
fying (Gaussian) assumptions is equivalent to the prediction
error. The minimization of the error-signal (at the different
hierarchical levels of a neural network) is generally computed
through a generalized gradient descent [44]. Hence, predic-
tive coding theory leads to model the brain activity by means
of a neural network with multiple neuronal layers (from the
top high hierarchical level, to the bottom sensory level) which
is governed by the backpropagation algorithm [148]; this al-
gorithm leads to the minimization of the error signal, adjust-
ing, iteratively, the weights of the prediction errors at different
network layers (such weights correspond to the precisions).
In machine learning and engineering fields artificial neural
networks have been extensively applied to a large number of
learning problems [148] (for classification, regression or pa-
rameters estimation). Hence through a neural network archi-
tecture, in principle, any nonlinear function or distribution can
be learned. Predictive coding theory and the above mentioned
concepts have been succesfully applied to perception [42] and
motion (action) learning (the so called active inference the-
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ory; [43, 44]) to communication learning [149]; moreover,
a predictive coding version of interoception (i.e., a model for
the autonomic, metabolic, immunological regulations so, gen-
erally speaking, for homeostasis and allostasis, and, poten-
tially, even for emotional regulations) has been proposed in
[150, 151, 152]. Nonetheless, we will show (see Section 5)
that the interoceptive predictive coding model, which could
hold for interoceptive visceromotor functions (i.e., homeosta-
sis and allostasis), cannot be directly applied to implicit emo-
tional learning, since it would lead to the instability of the
emotional system.
2.4. A new model for error-based emotional learning
In the following an error-based mathematical model for de-
scribing the dynamics of implicit emotional learning is de-
veloped. The main features of the proposed model, and its
similarities and differences with the models mentioned at the
end of Section 2.3 are summarised below.
A model for primary stimulus learning - The proposed
model describes the implicit learning of a UCS outcome (i.e.,
the UCS acquisition, inflation and devaluation: the UCS
revaluation) and, consequently, does not immediately refer,
unlike the classical conditioning models (like the Rescorla-
Wagner and TD models), to the learning of the associative
connection between a UCS and a paired CS [18]. Further
details about this are provided in Section 6.2, where the rela-
tionship between these two learning mechanisms is analysed
in detail.
Implicit emotional evaluation - In the development of our
model it is assumed that no cognitive or suggestion processes
occur during the interactions between a subject and the con-
sidered UCS; for this reason, our attention focuses on only im-
plicit (or automatic) emotional evaluation (in other words, in-
formation such as verbal suggestions, cognitive expectations,
beliefs and so on, are avoided). Nevertheless, the source of
stimulation has to brought to the attention of the subject. In
particular it has to be evident that the UCS is responsible for
the response elicitation, so that the outcome will be correctly
attribuited to that source. This assumption exludes the situa-
tion in which the outcome is misattribuited to another insignif-
icant stimulus [31, 32, 33, 34], or even not attributed (like
in the case of hidden drug administration). Furthermore, the
stimulus remains unchanged in the sequence of trials. Under
such assumptions, without any loss of generality, it can be as-
sumed that the predicted response (i.e., the expected outcome)
in a given trial, for the given stimulus, will coincide with the
response experienced during the last source-subject interac-
tion. Such an assumption simplifies the following mathemati-
cal computations and does not lead to any loss of the general-
ity, since, generally speaking, one might even assume that the
predicted outcome converges during trials (or during time) to
the real experienced outcome through a learning mechanism.
In the latter case the convergence of the emotional response
towards a steady state will simply be slower.
Multidimensional nature of the error-signal and evalua-
tion of a single component - As already mentioned in Section
1.3, a mathematical representation based on multidimensional
vectors should be adopted to properly describe the error sig-
nal involved in emotional learning and defined as the differ-
ence between the actually perceived response and its expected
counterpart; this is due to the fact that multiple (and specific)
emotional components could be elicited by a primary stimu-
lus. However, in the following we focus on the dynamics of a
single component to ease the reading. This choice, however,
does not entail any loss of generality, since our model can be
applied to any component.
Indistinguishability between the emotional component of
an active response and the corresponding reactive learned
response - As illustrated in Section 1.3, a learned reactive
response mimics the emotional components of the active re-
sponse elicited by a primary stimulus. For this reason, we
assume that the reactive and the active responses add up, so
generating the emotional component yem (see Eq. (2) and Re-
mark 5).
The essential neural network and the related neural func-
tions - The considered error signal is computed by a dis-
tribuited and dynamically interconnected neural network
whose master element is supposed to be the OFC (see Sec-
tions 2.2 and 2.3). This error-signal is transmitted by the net-
work to the amygdala, which, in turn, updates the emotional
reactive response associated with the representation of the pri-
mary stimulus. The processing of the error signal inside the
amygdala is represented by the (unknown) amygdala func-
tion, denoted FA (·) in the following.
As already discussed in Section 2.1, whenever a primary
stimulus is perceived, the amygdala elicits the reactive re-
sponse previously coded for that stimulus. In particular, the
amygdala is be able to arouse the cortex, and the emotional
and motivational brain regions directly and indirectly; this
process involves the system chain described in Section 2.3
and operating between the amygdala output and the emotional
brain systems. In the proposed model, the biological func-
tionality of this system chain is described by the (unknown)
system chain function FCh (·). Note that this function does not
lend itself to a simple description, since it is influenced by iter-
ative mechanisms involving neuronal and hormonal systems,
and various brain regions. In practice, FCh(·) represents the
processing which turns all the amygdala output signals into
emotional and motivational responses. These ideas are sum-
marised in Fig. 3, which shows the functional representation
proposed for the implicit emotional learning system.
Functional approximations - Generally speaking, the func-
tions FA (·) and FCh (·) may change over time, and are ex-
pected to be influenced by the internal physiological states
at the time the stimulus is encountered [153, 154, 155, 156],
external circumstances and various features of the eliciting
stimulus. Moreover, it is expected that the amygdala func-
tion depends also on the elicited sensory modality (e.g., audi-
tory, visual, olfactory). Finally, the behavior of these func-
tions change from component to component. However, in
the following it is always assumed, for simplicity, that these
functions are static; consequently, the influence of all the
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Figure 3: Discrete-time representation of the mechanisms on which the implicit emotional learning system is based. The functional connections between
the involved actors and the processing task accomplished by each block are shown. In particular, a stimulus could exert an active stimulation, a reactive
stimulation or both; in case of a reactive stimulation, the stimulus is perceived and, successively, the amygdala elicits the associated reactive response. The
amygdala output is being processed by the system chain network, which involve all the systems between the amygdala output and the emotional/motivational
brain regions (e.g., the nucleus accumbens, the sympathetic system, the hypothalamus and others). The orbitofrontal cortex updates the expected response
associated to a given stimulus and drives the error computation network for the computation of the emotional error signals. The error signals are sent to the
amygdala which updates the reactive responses associated to the given stimulus. The processes involved in the discrete-time emotional system are discuss in
detail in the following sections.
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above mentioned factors and possible habituation effects are
not taken into consideration. Moreover, their dependence on
the considered emotional component is not highlighted by the
adopted mathematical notation since, as already mentioned
above, we focus on a single emotional component.
3. A novel discrete-time dynamic model for the implicit
acquisition (and inflation) and devaluation (and extinc-
tion) of an emotional source
In this Section the discrete-time dynamic models for im-
plicit emotional learning during the source acquisition (and
inflation) and devaluation [18, 22, 20] (and extinction) are
developed. In particular, the source acquisition represents
the process through which an emotional source of stimula-
tion (i.e., UCS) is detected and coded within the brain; the in-
flation (devaluation), instead, represents the process through
which an UCS outcome (i.e., an UCR) increases (decreases)
with respect to the previously coded UCR. At the beginning
of our study some additional hypotheses needed in the de-
velopment of our model (and complementing the hypotheses
illustrated in Section 2.4) are listed and properly motivated,
and some details about the adopted mathematical notation are
provided.
3.1. Additional hypothesis and mathematical notation
Unless explicitly stated, the following hypotheses hold in
the development of our model.
H.1 - Discrete trials - Multiple trials in the interaction be-
tween a source and a subject are considered; the trial dura-
tion 4T is assumed to be relatively small and, in particular,
negligible with respect to the inter-trial interval (ITI) T . For
this reason, each trial can be ideally associated with a spe-
cific point on the time axis and the corresponding emotional
response can be deemed constant, so that a discrete time scale
[157] can be adopted in the representation of the considered
phenomena.
H.2 - Residual response from previous trials - The time con-
stant τ associated with the decay of the response elicited dur-
ing each trial is deemed negligible respect to the inter-trial
interval T ; consequently, when a new trial takes place, the
emotional response due to the previous trials has already van-
ished.
H.3 - Novelty of the source of stimulation - The stimulus
eliciting the emotional response is assumed to be neutral be-
fore the start of the trials (e.g., it is not a phylogenetic innate
source of stimulation).
H.4 - Stimulus perception - The perceived stimulus is the
same in each trial, so as the associated contextual informa-
tion and boundary conditions. This assumption states that, if a
stimulus elicits a subject during the first trial in a specific con-
text (e.g., place, timing, and specific boundary conditions), it
has to be considered that the stimulus perception in the follow-
ing trials involves exactly the same contextual and boundary
conditions. In the absence of such an assumption the reactive
response elicited by the stimulus perception might be mod-
ulated by the different contextual information and boundary
conditions. For instance, the perception of a threatening stim-
ulus (e.g., a snake) at a short distance and without barriers
should elicit a reactive response stronger than that due to the
same stimulus perceived at a larger distance or in the pres-
ence of a separation barrier (i.e., with different boundary con-
ditions and context).
H.5 - Response evolution - During the process of source
acquisition, the emotional response increases monotonically
over successive trials; this assumption is motivated by the
definition of acquisition and consolidation of a source stim-
ulus (hence, the extinction or de-valuation processes are not
taken into consideration in this case). On the contrary, during
the process of source devaluation or extinction, a monotonical
decrease of the emotional response is observed.
H.6 - Stability of the emotional system - The emotional re-
sponse does not diverge (i.e., does not tend to infinity) as the
number of trials increases.
In our analysis the following mathematical notation is
adopted. The emotional response and the active emotional
component characterizing the n-th trial are denoted yn and xn,
respectively (note that these quantities correspond to the terms
yem and yaem, respectively, in Eq. (3)), where n is the trial in-
dex (with n = 1,2, ...). In principle, the dependence of yn and
xn (and that of the amygdala function FA (·) and of the cor-
responding system chain function FCh (·); see the last part of
Section 2.4) on the emotional space component they refer to
should be indicated; in the following, however, such a depen-
dence is omitted to ease the reading. Note also that H.3 entails
that
y0 = 0, (4)
since the first trial corresponds to n = 1, whereas H.5 leads to
the inequality
yn ≥ yn−1 (5)
for the acquisition (and inflation) process and to
yn ≤ yn−1 (6)
for the devaluation process (with n ≥ 2 in both (5) and (6)).
Finally, H.6 can be formulated as
lim
n→∞|yn|< ∞ (7)
3.2. Quantitative analysis of source acquisition and inflation
In the following analysis the considered active source of
stimulation (see Definitions 1 and 2) could be represented,
for instance, by an electric shock device or by a drug admin-
istration. We argue that the last mentioned case represents
the acquisition of an implicit or unconscious placebo response
[158, 5, 95, 97, 159, 103].
In the first trial (i.e., for n = 1) the source stimulates the
subject for the first time, so eliciting the emotional response
y1 = x1. (8)
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The error (or difference) signal (defined the as difference
between the expected response and the really perceived re-
sponse; see (4) and (8))
e1 , y1− y0 = x1 (9)
is evaluated in parallel. Then, this signal is transmitted from
the error evaluation network to the amygdala, which computes
and stores (within the amygdala itself) the amygdala reactive
response
iA,1 = FA(e1) (10)
this quantity is associated with the representation of the elic-
iting stimulus (i.e., the acquired source of stimulation, UCS).
Such a stimulus representation is also stored within the amyg-
dala and, in particular in the BLA [55, 54] (other related con-
textual information are stored in the hippocampus [55]).
As already mentioned previously (see subsection 2.1), after
the acquisition process described above, whenever the subject
perceives the source of stimulation, his/her amygdala elicits
the previously coded (and stored) reactive response iA,1 (the
stimulus perception process has to be interpreted in the sense
given in H.4). At the level of emotional and motivational brain
areas the direct and indirect effects of iA,1 result in the reactive
response
iR,1 = FCh(iA,1), (11)
which depends on the full system chain (i.e., on all the systems
elicited by the amygdala and their interactions). Note that
iR,1 (11) is elicited independently of the fact that the source
stimulates actively (i.e., physically) the subject, because of its
reactive nature.
In the second trial, if the subject, after perceiving the stim-
ulus and having triggered the emotional reactive response as-
sociated with it, is also physically stimulated, the emotional
response is updated on the basis of the active response x2
elicited by the source and the elicited reactive response iR,1
(determined by the amygdala in the previous trial, during
which the emotional response has been learned). Then, we
have
y2 = x2+ iR,1; (12)
here x2, which represents the response originating from the
physical interaction between the subject and the source stim-
ulus in the second trial, cannot be smaller than x1, since the
source acquisition/inflation is being considered (see H.5). Af-
ter the response y2 has been elicited, the new error signal (see
(9))
e2 , y2− y1 (13)
encoding the difference between what was expected (y1) and
what is experienced (y2) is sent to the amygdala; this, in turn,
updates the stored emotional reactive response accordingly
(note that the stimulus remains unchanged over all the trials,
so that in the absence of cognitive or suggestion processes the
expected value y1 is exclusively due to the value implicitly
stored at the end of the previous source-subject interaction;
see H.4). Moreover, the updated reactive response, which is
computed and stored within the amygdala, is given by the sum
of the previous reactive component with the increase due to
the last error signal e2. For this reason, it is given by
iA,2 = iA,1+FA(e2). (14)
The amygdala reaction iA,2, in turn, reflects the emotional
response in the emotional/motivational brain areas, which is
given by
iR,2 = FCh (iA,2) . (15)
Similarly, in the third trial, the response
y3 = x3+ iR,2 (16)
is elicited. The last equation can be easily rewritten (see Eqs.
(10), (13), (14) and (15))
y3 = x3+FCh (iA,2)
= x3+FCh (iA,1+FA(e2))
= x3+FCh (FA(e1)+FA(e2))
= x3+FCh (FA(y1− y0)+FA(y2− y1)) .
(17)
Following the line of reasoning illustrated above leads easily
to the general expression
yn = xn+FCh
(
n−1
∑
k=1
FA (ek)
)
(18)
holding for n ≥ 2. It is important to point out that the sum
appearing in the right hand side of (18) represents the stor-
ing process within the amygdala (i.e., the emotional learn-
ing process involving all the past experience); however, no
quantitative result can be inferred from (18) in the absence of
some information about the structure of the functions FA (·)
and FCh (·). As far as the last point is concerned, in the fol-
lowing it is assumed that FA(0) = 0 and FCh(0) = 0, and that
both FA (arg) and FCh (arg) can be properly approximated as
linear functions for small values of |arg|. Consequently, the
first order Taylor approximations
FA(arg)' γ ·arg (19)
FCh(arg)w Γ ·arg (20)
can be adopted, where γ and Γ denote the first derivatives
of FA (arg) and FCh (arg) , respectively, evaluated at arg = 0
(γ and Γ denote the reactivity of the amygdala and the system
chain, respectively, and take on real values and, similarly as
the parameter α defined below, depend on the selected emo-
tional component). Then, if the parameter
α , γ ·Γ (21)
is defined, Eq. (18) can be approximated as
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yn = xn+α ·∑n−1k=1 ek =
xn+α ·∑n−1k=1(yk− yk−1),
(22)
which represents a first order approximation model. The last
equation can be reformulated, after some manipulations, as
(see also (4))
yn = xn+α · (yn−1− y0)
= xn+α · yn−1 (23)
which shows the recursive nature of the emotional dynamic
learning system, described by a first order non-homogeneous
model [160]; note that emotional stability (see H.6) requires
the modulus of the parameter α to be strictly less than unity
[160] (i.e., |α|< 1).
From the last result and our previous assumptions it easily
inferred that a complete dynamic model describing emotional
learning in an approximate fashion is expressed by (23),
yn+1 > yn (24)
for any n ∈ N (with y0 = 0) and
yn = yn−1 (25)
when the error signal en is equal to zero.
Let us now analyse the implications of Eqs. (23-25), we
assume that, without any loss of generality, the active elicited
response is constant at every trial (e.g., the amplitude of the
stimulus is constant, so as the elicited active response), so that
xn = X (26)
for n≥ 1, where X denotes a constant. Then, (23) turns into
yn = X +α · yn−1, (27)
which can be interpreted in terms of eq. (3), since X rep-
resents the active response, whereas α · yn−1 the associated
reactive response (iR). It is easy to show that, in this case, the
emotional response in the n-trial is given by
yn = X ·
(
αn
α−1 −
1
α−1
)
(28)
so that it approaches the asymptotic value
y∗ = X · 1
1−α (29)
as n increases (in practice, after a few source-subject interac-
tions, yn closely approaches y∗). Then, substituting (29) in the
right-hand side of (27) yields
y∗ = X +
α
1−α X (30)
which, once again, shows that the emotional response consists
of an active component (X) and a reactive component
i∗R =
α
1−α X (31)
On the basis of the last results, it is not difficult to show that, if
α > 0.5, the emotional reactive response (iR) becomes greater
than its active counterpart as the number of trial increases.
This phenomenon can occur, for instance, in a limited num-
ber of repeated trials if the reactivity of the amygdala, at least
for a specific emotional component, is relatively strong (i.e.,
γ takes on a large value). In this case the acquired emotional
reaction could become very intense after some trials, even in
the presence of a modest active response due to a source phys-
ical stimulation. It is worth mentioning that the amygdala re-
activity could be increased, for instance, by stress hormones
(through direct and indirect mechanisms) [161].
Finally, it is worth mentioning that, if the source of stimu-
lation is a phylogenetic source (i.e., a prepared biological and
evolutionary fear relevant stimulus coded in the mammalian
amygdala since birth [162, 1, 2, 90]), an emotional reaction
Y0 can be natively coded and stored within the amygdala [90].
For this reason, as soon as this source is perceived, an emo-
tional reactive response Y0 could be elicited even in the ab-
sence of previous source-subject interactions. In this case the
dynamic model for the increase (inflation) of the emotional
response
yn = X +Y0+α · (yn−1−Y0) (32)
can be easily derived from (23).
3.2.1. Theorem: On the necessity of both the reactive re-
sponse and the expected (predicted) outcome for the
stability of the emotional system
It is important to point out that the reactive response deter-
mined by the amygdala (iR) and the expected outcome (i.e. to
yexpected ; this, on the basis of our assumptions, can be consid-
ered equal to the last occured outcome, i.e. to yn−1) are both
required in order to ensure that the elicited response does not
diverge if the number of successive trials increases (in other
words, the response does not becomes arbitrarily large as the
number of UCS stimulation trials increases; see H.6).
Proof. Proof by contradiction (reductio ad absurdum)
Hypothesis 1: the reactive response associated with a stim-
ulus representation (i.e., with an UCS representation) coin-
cides with the expected (predicted) outcome, and the expected
or predicted outcome converges to the experienced outcome.
Hypotheses H.1 - H.6 and the Remarks 4-5 holds.
Hypothesis 1 asserts that a unique reactive signal predict-
ing the UCS outcome exists, and that this signal coincides
with the reactive response elicited when the UCS is perceived;
furthermore, the predicting signal converges (by learning) to
the actual experienced elicitation. The last assumption has
been formulated to include a more general scenario than that
considered in our initial assumptions, in which the expected
outcome coincides with the last experienced outcome. From
a mathematical viewpoint, the expected outcome can be com-
puted using any supervised learning method (or, alternatively,
TD methods [40]) in which the predicted outcome is evaluated
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on the basis of the past m predictions (i.e., of the predicted
outcomes in the last m trials) and of the actual outcome, min-
imizing the error between the prediction and the experienced
outcome. Otherwise it can be assumed that the predicted out-
come coincides with the last experienced outcome.
1. Let the UCS be an active source of stimulation (e.g., a
painful stimulation or a drug administration).
2. The UCS is perceived by a given subject on successive
trials, then it exerts an active elicitation (i.e., it elicits the
active response X). During the first trial the response
is exclusively due to the active UCS elicitation, that is
y1 = X . After the first trial (for instance, during the UCS
perception in the second trial), the predicted (reactive)
response, called ypredicted,1, is computed.
3. In the second trial, after the UCS perception, the pre-
dicted outcome (ypredicted,1) adds up to the successive
UCS active elicitation, so that the outcome can be ex-
pressed as y2 = yexpected,1 + X . Furthermore, since
ypredicted,1 does not coincide with the actual experi-
enced outcome, the new prediction ypredicted,2 is com-
puted after the second trial; it can be easily proved that
ypredicted,2 > ypredicted,1 (since the experienced outcome
has been strengthened and the error signal has to be min-
imized).
4. In the third trial the experienced outcome can be writ-
ten as y3 = ypredicted,2 +X ; since y3 > y2 ≥ ypredicted,2 a
new value for the predicted response is computed, called
ypredicted,3, such that ypredicted,3 > ypredicted,2.
5. In the n-th trial the outcome can be expressed as yn =
ypredicted,n−1 + X ; it is easy to prove that yn > yn−1 ≥
ypredicted,n−1. Moreover, if the number of trials tends to
infinity, the outcome grows indefinitely (i.e., lim
n→∞yn =
∞).
6. The last statement is absurd, as it contradicts hypothesis
H.6.
3.2.2. Quantitative analysis of source devaluation and exct-
inction
Let us assume now that in the n0-th trial (corresponding
to the beginning of the extinction process), the considered
source does cease to stimulate actively the subject (e.g., an
inert drug is administered, after that the asymptotic response
expressed by Eq. (29) has been reached through the admin-
istration of an effective active drug in the previous trials). In
this case, Eqs. (23)-(25) turn into
yn = α · yn−1 (33)
for n > n0,
y0 = Y0 (34)
and
yn = yn−1 (35)
when the error signal en is equal to zero, respectively. These
formulas show that, even if the active stimulation drops to
zero, the corresponding reactive response, which depends
on the previous source-subject interactions, does not vanish
abruptly, but exhibits a decay rate depending on the value of
the parameter α . In particular, if n0 = 0 and Y0 denotes y0
(note that (4) does not hold in this case), from (33) it is easily
inferred that
yn = Y0 ·αn (36)
This result shows that, if |α| < 1, yn asymptotically tends to
zero in the absence of an active elicitation.
3.3. Emotional response dynamics in discrete time scale
The mathematical results derived in Sections 3.2 and 3.2.2,
taken together, can be employed for evaluating the emotional
response to an arbitrary pattern of physical source elicitation,
that is in the general case of source revaluation [18, 22, 20].
Hence, the emotional adaptation, on the basis of the variabil-
ity of the phisical stimulation of a given stimulus (UCS) dur-
ing successive trials, can be quantitatively described.
Moreover, we argue that, in investigating the emotional re-
sponse in the presence of an arbitrary active stimulation, it is
important to understand under which conditions the equality
(25) holds, i.e. the error signal is equal to zero (excluding, of
course, the trivial cases in which the source is extinguished,
i.e., yn = 0, or the response reaches its asymptotic value (29)).
In fact, this should allow to acquire a deeper understand-
ing and a quantitative description of diverse psychophysio-
logical phenomena, like particular forms of placebo/nocebo
effects, evaluative conditioning phenomena, and some psy-
chiatric and psychological disorders, like panic attacks, post
traumatic stress disorders (PTSD) and others. Further details
about this issue are provided in the next Sections (4.2 and 8).
3.4. On the impact of excitation decay
The proposed dynamic model can be modified to account
for the excitation decay [31, 92, 93, 28], because of which
a certain time (denoted τ) is needed to dissipate an elicited
response. In practice, this phenomenon becomes relevant
through successive trials when the inter-trial interval T is rela-
tively small with respect to the time constant τ characterizing
the dominantly humorally controlled factor of the emotional
response (and, consequently, H.2 does not hold). In fact in
[28] it is shown that, under some conditions, an emotional
excitation can be transferred even to a successive independent
source of stimulation, because of the residual excitation due to
the incomplete decay of the previous source stimulation. This
phenomenon is called excitation transfer [28, 29]. In these
conditions, the response aroused in each trial is due to both
the actual (both physiological/active and reactive) elicitation
and to the residual excitation from the previous trial; more-
over, the dissipation rate of the emotional response (i.e., the
value taken on by the parameter τ) is influenced by the inten-
sity of the aroused response, intervening distractions, fatigue
[31] and other factors [92].
If an exponential decay is assumed for the dominantly hu-
morally controlled response, the recursive equation
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yn = X + yn−1 · (α+ξ · exp(−T/τ)) , (37)
can be derived for the evaluation of yn (following the same
line of reasoning as that adopted for the derivation of Eq.
(27)); here, ξ is a positive parameter representing the fraction
of the emotional response decaying according to an exponen-
tial law (consequently, 0 < ξ < 1). From the last equation
the stability condition (i.e., the condition ensuring that the
emotional response does not diverge as the number of trials
increases; see H.6 in Section 3.1)
α+ξ · exp(−T/τ)< 1 (38)
can be easily inferred. Moreover, on the basis of eq. (37) it
can be easily proved that the final emotional value associated
with the source of stimulation increases as T gets smaller. In
some cases, however, the ITI could change over the sequence
of trials. For instance, a “fast” emotional acquisition, result-
ing from a group of some very close trials, could be followed
by another group of trials characterized by a larger ITI. In this
case, if the second group starts only after the end of the ex-
citation decay of first group, then the response will naturally
decrease according to Eq. (23) until the asymptote expressed
by (29) is reached. Finally, we note that, from a quantitative
perspective, the effects of an excitation decay in close trials
could be illusorily perceived as a larger value for the parame-
tere α as long as the trials are temporally close to each other.
3.5. On the inclusion of contrast effects in the discrete-time
model
In the literature it is well documented [35, 163] that surpris-
ing reward omissions, that is, the absence or reduction of an
expected reward, are accompanied by aversive emotional re-
actions, at least in mammals [163]. On the contrary, surprising
increases in the expected reward result in an appetitive emo-
tional reaction. In particular, positive and negative contrast
effects, arising from unexpected shifts in the obtained reward
(whose value is greater or smaller than that previously expe-
rienced), depend on the comparison of the sensory property
of the present stimulus with information stored in memory
[164] and lead to an emotional response overshoot or under-
shoot, which is independent from the absolute value of the
real reward. For instance, in [164] it is shown that rats, in the
presence of a shift from 32% to a 4% of the administred su-
crose solution, displayed a successive negative contrast (i.e., a
depression effect [35]) by initiating significantly fewer bouts
of licking than control rats maintained on 4% sucrose. Fur-
thermore, no significant increase in the dopamine efflux in the
NAcc was observed during the consumption of 4% sucrose by
rats that experienced the shift from 32%; on the contrary, the
consumption of 4% sucrose by control rats was accompained
by a significant increase in the DA efflux in the NAcc.
Generally speaking, the emotional “overshoot” experi-
enced during positive contrast is termed elation effect; in-
stead, the “undershoot” experienced after a negative contrast
is termed depression effect [35].
Contrast effects can be interpreted in terms of emotional
responses, as indirectly suggested by the effects of drugs on
contrast [35]. In fact, experimental data reveal that drugs hav-
ing anxiolytic effects on humans (e.g., amobarbital, ethanol,
and benzodiazepines) tend to reduce negative contrasts. In-
terestingly, the barbiturate drug reduces negative contrast, but
does not have any effect on positive contrast [35]. The hy-
pothesis according to which emotional responses are involved
in contrasts is also supported by the experiments reviewed in
[35] and showing that an increased release of adrenocorticos-
teroid hormones is detected in the presence of negative con-
trasts; this proves that a negative contrast is able to activate a
component of the sympathetic response to stress. In addition,
the responses evoked by negative contrasts are often charac-
terized by a long duration and sometimes do not dissipate by
the end of the experiment [35].
Experimental evidence also shows that contrast exhibits an
inverse dependence on the inter trial interval T and a di-
rect dependence with the magnitude difference between the
preshift and the postshift values (in other words, it is propor-
tional to the error signal, defined as the difference between
the expected outcome and the perceived outcome). For this
reason, prior experience (e.g., prior trials) with the source
of stimulation determining the expected value (or outcome)
plays a fundamental role in determining contrast effects.
Given the empirical results illustrated above, we argue that
contrast effects can be included in the proposed model for
implicit emotional learning by adding a new function, called
contrast function and denoted C(eA;T ); this function exhibits
a nonlinear dependence on T and on the actual error-signal,
defined as
eA,n , (xn+α · yn−1)− yn−1 (39)
for the n-th trial; note that this definition is motivated by the
fact that the error signal refers to the present trial (instead of
the previous one), since contrast effects occur in parallel with
the actual outcome. Consequently, the emotional response
during the n-th trial can be evaluated as (see Eq. (23))
yn = xn+α · yn−1+C (eA,T ) · eA,n (40)
if eA,n 6= 0 and
yn = yn−1 (41)
if en = 0 and eA,n = 0
The following properties can be reasonably assumed for
C(eA;T ): a) C(eA;T )∼= 0 if 0≤ eA ≤ TA, where TA is a proper
threshold; b) C(eA;T ) ∼= K (where K is a positive constant)
if eA > TA for a fixed T ; c) C(eA;T ) is inversely proportional
to the ITI (i.e.,C(eA;T ) ∝ 1/T ). Property (a) derives from the
fact that no contrast effect is expected for a relatively small
error signal; (b) is based on a first order approximation and
(c) comes from empirical observations [35].
The quantities TA and K have to be experimentally esti-
mated. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that they could
depend on the specific emotional component elicited during
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the stimulation (e.g., the dopaminergic neuronal population
in the NAcc).
It is not difficult to show that a simple continuos function
approximately satisfying the above mentioned conditions is
C(eA;T ) =
K
1+ e−(eA−TA)
· 1
T
(42)
This can be approximated by the linearized model
C(eA)' K · eA (43)
If Eq. (43) is adopted to model the contrast effect, an unex-
pected UCS elicitation (i.e., an active UCS stimulation which
is not signalled by a CS nor by the UCS perception, such as,
for instance, a permanently-connected electric shock device
elicitation) determines the response
yUCS = X +K ·X , (44)
and is attributed to the UCS. Furthermore, depending on the
value expected for the UCS before the unexpected elicitation,
the error signal is computed and the reactive response associ-
ated with the UCS is updated accordingly; in particular, if the
expected response before the unexpected elicitation is equal to
X +αX , the error signal becomes e = X · (K−α). Moreover,
if another unexpected UCS elicitation occurs, the resulting er-
ror signal is equal to zero since the expected outcome (which
coincides with the last outcome) is now equal to the actually
experienced outcome, which is given by X +K ·X (i.e., the
active elicitation and the contrast contribution due to the un-
expected elicitation). This mathematical result is important
because shows that a series of trials of unexpected UCS elici-
tations lead to an error signal different from zero only during
the first unexpected elicitation, in fact, in the successive unex-
pected trials this leads to a static situation in which the error
signal remains equal to zero and a constant reactive contribu-
tion (i.e., K ·X) due to the contrast effect is elicited.
Moreover, if the Eq. (43) is adopted to model the contrast
effect and if it is assumed that 0 < K < 1, it is easy to demon-
strate that Eq. (40) becomes
yn = (1+K) · xn+(α+Kα−K) · yn−1. (45)
Furthermore, if it is assumed that xn = X for every trial
(see Eq.(26)), the asymptotic solution for the Eq. (45) coin-
cides with the one obtained in the absence of the contrast ef-
fect (see Eq. (29)). This last result is motivated by the fact that
during successive trials the contrast effect decreases, since the
expected outcome (which is signalled by the UCS perception
before the UCS active elicitation) approaches the experienced
outcome (i.e., both the error signal and the actual error signal
tend to zero over successive trials). Note also that the con-
trast effect could be negative, for instance, if the experienced
outcome is smaller than its expected counterpart a response
inhibition occurs. For this reason, if the active elicitation xn
drops to zero, the response decreases faster than in the case in
which no contrast is considered, since the term (α+Kα−K)
in the second side of Eq. (45) is smaller than α (see Eq. (23)).
Finally, we argue that, if the contrast effect and the ef-
fect of the excitation decay are included in our discrete-time
model (see also the classical conditioning model in Section
6.4), such a model should also be able to justify the sponta-
neous recovery effect [36], which could occur after a classical
conditioning extinction. This phenomenon, which consists in
the possibility of experiencing a conditioned response some
time after a complete conditioned extinction, cannot be de-
scribed in terms of the Rescorla-Wagner model [36]. More-
over, we argue that the passive residual response due to a con-
trast effect (e.g., an inhibitory response due to the lack of an
expected UCS elicitation) is able to counteract the effect of a
residual conditioned Pavlovian response, which, in turn, it can
not be detected. For this reason, after the dissipation of a con-
trast passive response, the conditioned reflex can be observed
again. Our viewpoint is partially supported by the fact that
spontaneus recovery is stronger when conditioning extinction
occurs through massed trials (i.e., in the presence of a small
ITI, which are known to enhance contrast effects) and weaker
when extinction occurs through widely spaced trials (i.e., in
the presence of a larger ITI which determines a smaller con-
trast effect) [165].
4. Misattribution of a source of stimulation and evaluative
conditioning
When a source of emotional stimulation elicits a subject,
the process of encoding emotional memory starts; this in-
volves various interactions between the amygdala and the hip-
pocampus [113]. This encoding results in the processing and
storage of different pieces of information, such as contextual
information, the elements determining internal states and the
elicited response. Generally speaking, the hippocampus (and,
in particular, the dentate gyrus, DG) encodes contextual in-
formation, whereas the BLA encodes emotional valence and
unconditioned stimulus representation [54, 55]. The encoding
of emotional memory requires that the source of stimulation
is correctly detected and attributed. When an emotional re-
sponse due to a source of stimulation is attributed to a wrong
source, an event of source misattribution occurs (e.g., see
[31, 32, 33], and references therein). Note that misattributions
may result either from conscious, accessible and measurable
controlled processes, or from spontaneous, inaccesible, auto-
matic processes [30, 34]. In the last case this phenomenon is
called implicit misattribution (e.g., see [30, 79, 34]).
A quantitative description of the source misattribution phe-
nomena can be developed on the basis of our dynamic model;
moreover, the new results about this topic shed new light on
the problem of evaluative conditioning (EC). Both these is-
sues are illustrated in the remaining part of this Section.
4.1. Source misattribution: a quantitative analysis
Let us focus again, like in the previous Section, on mul-
tiple trials of the interaction between a given aource and a
subject and assume a discrete-time scale in our analysis. In
a generic trial one of the following mutually exclusive events
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might happen: 1) the elicited response is correctly attributed
to the source of stimulation, so that the emotional reactive re-
sponse is computed and coded according to Eq. (27); 2) no
source of stimulation is identified and, consequently, no reac-
tive response is encoded and associated with the source; 3) the
elicited response is misattributed to another (others) source(s)
of stimulation. In the following we focus on the last event
and assume, without any loss of generality, that the misat-
tributed source of stimulation is initially neutral (i.e., it does
not elicit an active or a reactive emotional response). Actually,
this event encompasses the following three mutually exclusive
cases:
a) The misattribution occurs in the presence of an active re-
sponse; for instance, this occurs when an hidden active source
of stimulation (e.g., the hidden administration of a given drug
able to elicit an emotional component) is misattributed to an-
other insignificant source of stimulation.
b) The misattribution occurs in the presence of a residual
(i.e., passive) response decay only (in other words, no active
or reactive responses are elicited); in this case the misattri-
bution trial follows the elicitation trial and occurs during the
excitation decay.
c) The misattribution occurs when a purely reactive source
of stimulation is eliciting the subject, so that the associated
response is purely reactive.
If the misattributed source of stimulation is not neutral but
elicits a response, the response elicited during the misattri-
bution process will result from the superposition of the ac-
tual source response with the previous non-attributed emo-
tional state [28]. For this reason, in this case the previous
non-attributed emotional state “energizes” the actual source.
In the following the above mentioned three cases are anal-
ysed in the framework of the dynamical model developed in
the previous Section; moreover, it is assumed that misattri-
bution always occurs in the first trial and that the previous
reactive response is equal to zero (i.e., y0 = 0).
Case a): Misattribution occurring in the presence of an active
response.
In this case, the response in the first trial is only due to the
active component (i.e., to X ; see Eq. (27)) elicited by a non-
attributed source of stimulation (e.g., an hidden administered
drug). Consequently, the error signal in the first trial, denoted
e1, is equal to X and the corresponding reactive component
(expressed by α ·X) is coded for the new misattributed source
of stimulation. If the original (i.e., true) source of stimulation
ceases to actively elicitate the subject in the following trials
(i.e., the physical active component becomes zero), a nega-
tive error signal is computed. In this case, after repetitive ex-
pousures of the misattributed source without active elicitation,
the emotional response asymptotically tends to zero (accord-
ing to a mathematical law similar to that expressed by Eq.
(36).
Case b): Misattribution occuring in the presence of a decay-
ing residual response only.
This case is known in literature as transfer paradigm (de-
scribed in the Hullian drive theory [92]) or excitation transfer
[166, 28, 29], and refers to the influence of a prior episode
of arousal on subsequent emotional responses. In this case,
since environmental cues about the actual source of a residual
arousal are missing, such an arousal is misattributed to a sub-
sequent stimulus; this may result in an intensification of the
subject’s emotional response to the new stimulus (see [166]
and references therein). In this case, in the first trial the reg-
istered response is due to a passive (residual) response only,
which is denoted ξ in the following. Consequently, the error
e1 in the first trial is equal to ξ and the reactive response stored
for the misattributed source is equal to α ·ξ . Moreover, if the
subject is elicited by the misattributed source in a successive
trial, the corresponding reactive response is given again by
α ·ξ , which is smaller than what was expected for that source
(i.e., ξ ), so that a negative error signal is computed. There-
fore, if further trials occur, the emotional response asymptot-
ically tends to zero, similarly as in the previous case.
Case c): Misattribution occurring in the presence of a purely
reactive source of stimulation eliciting the subject.
In this case, the response in the first trial (when the mis-
attribution is occuring), called iU , is due to a purely reactive
response elicited by another unrevealed source (e.g., a sub-
liminal emotional stimulation [162, 119, 167]). Hence, the
response attributed to the new source (because of the misat-
tribution) is equal to iU , which, in this case, is exactly what
the amygdala is eliciting, so that the error e1 in the first trial
is equal to zero (i.e., the elicited response coincides with the
expected response). Hence, during the second trial, the ex-
pousure to the new source determines the reactive response
elicited by the amygdala during the first trial (iU ); further-
more, since the contribution due to the error signal is equal to
zero, the overall response remains equal to iU . For the same
reason, the response remains constant during the successive
trials. These results, that hold if habituation or mere exposure
phenomena [168] are neglected, show that an inextinguish-
able (i.e., not vanishing through repetitive trials of source per-
ception) reactive response can be obtained through a complete
misattribution of a purely reactive emotional response. Note
that, generally speaking, a source of stimulation is expected to
elicit an active component too, and when this active compo-
nent is no longer present, a negative error signal drives the re-
sponse extinction through repetitive expousures, as illustrated
in the Section 3.2.2. On the contrary, our mathematical results
show that, if the stored response associated with a stimulus is
purely reactive (i.e., no active component is expected), the er-
ror signal is equal to zero in each trial, because the reactive
response corresponds to the expected response; for this rea-
son, no updating of the emotional reactive response occurs.
A concrete example of such effect is the EC through implicit
misattribution [79, 33] (see Section 4.2).
Let us define now a non-active stimulus as a stimulus elicit-
ing a reactive (or null) response only; given this definition, our
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main finding can be summarised in the following corollary.
COROLLARY 1
If a purely reactive emotional response is attributed to
a non-active stimulus, this stimulus becomes a resistant-to-
extinction source of reactive emotional stimulation.
Corollary 1 allows us to justify the inextinguishability of
EC due to implicit misattribution (see [79, 33] and references
therein), and could suggest a mechanism for other forms of
resistant-to-extinction responses. In practice, through the re-
peated application of Corollary 1, in each misattribution stage
the reactive response is given by the sum of the previous re-
active responses evoked by the considered stimulus (because
of the resistant-to-extinction nature of the reactive stimulus it-
self) with the actual misattributed reaction (in other words, the
reactive response is cumulative). This could explain why an
emotional additive increase can be obtained naturally in every
day life through the so called incubation effect [68, 19] (note
that even a summation of different reactive sources could be
misattributed to one single target stimulus). More specifi-
cally, some neurotic individuals can rehearse a trauma in their
minds, or people can misattribute some background emotional
states (such as mood and others irrilevant and disconnected
emotional events) forward a target stimulus, which, in turn,
becomes able to elicit a stronger arousal at every misattribu-
tion or rumination stage [19].
Furthermore, Corollary 1 provides theoretical basis for the
develpment of purely reactive emotional stimuli: in princi-
ple, an additive and a resistant-to-extinction emotional re-
action can be obtained in a controlled environment, through
repetitive interactions between a subject, a non-detectable re-
active emotional source (the misattributed source) and a tar-
get stimulus (to be attributed). In practice, a confounding
source (or a compound of confounding sources) of reactive
stimulation could elicit a subject in the presence of a target
stimulus, which has to become the attributed source of stim-
ulation. Moreover, through repetitive elicitations, the target
stimulus is expected to produce an inextinguishable and in-
creasing reactive response. One method to obtain a com-
pound of confounding reactive sources is to develop a sublim-
inal masked expousure of an emotional and sufficently strong
aroused stimulus [1, 169, 170, 2, 90], while a target stimu-
lus has to be clearly perceived by the subject. To this aim the
confounding reactive stimulus has to elicit the same emotional
components as the target, in order to obtain the superposition
(i.e., the algebraic sum) of multiple contributions, i.e. the pro-
cess we call implicit accumulation effect. We believe that fur-
ther research activities are needed to understand how to con-
struct and optimize a suitable target stimulus (which must be
easily attribuitable by a subject in relation to the emotional in-
duced response) and which sensory elements (e.g., tactile, vi-
sual or auditory elements) should be included, in order to op-
timize the effect. Furthermore, it is important to consider that
a misattribution mechanism requires that the response evoked
by the UCS could feasibly have arisen from the target CS,
so some minimal degree of feature matching is a necessary
condition; without it, source confusion (and misattribution) is
unlikely to occur [33].
Finally, it is important to point out that a practical exploita-
tion of our results could be represented by the development
of novel methods to mitigate an undesired emotional reac-
tion. In fact, in principle, an undesired reactive response could
be weakened through the misattributed elicitation of an oppo-
site valenced reactive response (for instance the pain percep-
tion can be weakened through the stimulation with reward-
ing reactive stimulus, or it can enhanced through the stimula-
tion with anxiety related or emotionally threatening reactive
stimulus [12, 13, 14]), or through a reactive inhibition. This
might represent a valid supporting tool for treating certain
psychopathologies for which the mere exposure treatment,
even if coupled with drug administration, could fail to extin-
guish an undesired emotional reactive response (see Section
8.1).
4.2. Evaluative conditioning through implicit misattribution
As already mentioned above, the EC phenomenon repre-
sents the formation (or change of the valence) of a stimu-
lus, called CS, originating from a prior pairing of the CS it-
self with another stimulus, called UCS [171, 75, 78, 172, 79,
33]; unlike Pavlovian conditioning, a CS response acquired
through EC seems to be resistant to extinction [72].
In recent years various research activities have been de-
voted to investigate the role played in EC by the aware-
ness of contingencies between a CS and its paired UCS
[71, 171, 73, 79, 173]. In particular, experimental evidence
illustrated in [79] leads to the conclusion that the EC occur-
rence can be justified by different mechanisms, like classi-
cal conditioning (and, consequently, the awareness of CS-
UCS contingencies) and implicit misattribution (in this case,
awareness is not required). In the same reference it is also
shown that sequential CS-UCS presentations are subject to
UCS revaluation, retroactive inference from subsequent learn-
ing and contingency awareness (these phenomena are typi-
cally related to classical conditioning); on the contrary, a si-
multaneous CS-UCS presentation, which, generally speaking,
prevents awareness and facilitates the source misattribution,
can produce EC effects which are robust against all the fac-
tors mentioned above. Moreover, in [33] it is shown that,
according to the implicit misattribution model, responses to
UCSs can be misattributed without awareness to the CS, and
that the implicit misattribution depends on source confusabil-
ity, in other words the subject has to confuse which multiple
coocuring stimuli in her environment is evoking the evaluative
response. Furthermore, manipulations of the variables related
to the potential for the misattribution of an evaluation, (i.e.,
the source confusability) show that greater EC occurs with an
higher degree of confusability [33]. Hence, as already dis-
cussed in the previous Section, the inextinguishability of the
CS valence in EC phenomena due to implicit misattribution
can be explained in terms of Corollary 1; in other words, it is
motivated by the fact that the UCS (e.g., a reactive stimulus
such as an emotional picture) behaves like a purely reactive
source of stimulation, and the reactive outcome is attributed
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(at least partially) to the CS, so that the response stored and
expected for that stimulus is purely reactive (see also the Case
c in the Section 4.1 for the quantitative analysis). This result is
also supported by Baeyens and colleagues [171], who found
that EC was not sensitive to the degree of statistical contin-
gency between the CS and US, but EC should increased with
the absolute number of pairings because each provides an op-
portunity for misattribution, and such misattributions could
act cumulatively [33]. It is worth mentioning that EC could
also be determined by other mechanisms, or by the combina-
tions of different mechanisms [33], such as, classical condi-
tioning, the formation of particular beliefs about the CS and
conceptual recategorization of the CS [33].
5. Differences and relations between the implicit emo-
tional model and the predictive coding model
The predictive coding (or active inference) version of in-
teroception [150, 151, 152], described in Section 2.3, cannot
be applied to implicit emotional learning because the theorem
derived in Section 3.2.1. In fact, since the prediction signal
(which coincides with the reactive response in predictive cod-
ing) and the active (bottom-up sensory) elicitation sum up,
the prediction response would increase indefinitely over suc-
cessive trials. One might argue that the precision associated
with the error signal originating from the reactive (self-made)
emotional response should be reduced by attentional mecha-
nisms, like in active inference in primary motor cortex (M1),
where the gain (or precision) associated with the sensations
originating from the self-made action are reduced [150, 174]
(see also the corollary discharge; e.g. [175]). Nevertheless,
this cannot occur within the emotional system, since, the reac-
tive and the active emotional responses are indistinguishable
and, for this reason, add up in algebraic sense, as shown by
the experimental evidence described in Section 1.3.
Despite this, we argue that the predictive coding principle
could be applied under the assumption that different hierar-
chical neural networks operate in succession, and others in
parallel, during implicit emotional learning. More specifi-
cally, if an active stimulus elicitates a given subject, a first
neural network, describing perception, determines which is
the most probable stimulus responsible for the elicitation (i.e.,
the source attribution process) through the maximization of
the Bayesian posterior probability distribution (or the free en-
ergy minimization, which leads to the “surprise” or entropy
minimization [43, 42]), then the network for the computa-
tion of the expected outcome (managed by the OFC) interacts
with the network which computes the updating of the reac-
tive responses (within the amygdala). However, our model
provides a system level representation of implicit emotional
learning and, for this reason, the details about the iterative
computations (and messages passing) between neurons or be-
tween different neuronal hierarchical levels of the involved
signals (such as error signals, expected outcomes or reactive
responses, and the neural computations leading to source attri-
bution) are behind the scope of our analysis. For instance, our
system-level model assumes that a distributed network com-
putes error signals without entering into the details of such
a computation; hence, for example, our model cannot be ac-
count for phenomena or physiopathologies originating from
a defect in the error computation processes (such as a patho-
logical dopamine system unable to properly compute the pre-
cisions associated with the error signals). Nevertheless, our
model can specifically predict phenomena and pathologies
originating from system-level problems (in other words, it
provides a macro-level perspective). Furthermore, our model
does not describe the computations leading to source attri-
bution, instead it describes the effects originating from the
cases in which, during a stimulation, a stimulus is correctly
attributed, misattributed or even not attributed. Finally, it is
worth mentioning that an important similarity between the
proposed implicit emotional learning model and the active in-
ference model is represented by the fact that the brain can
experience a reactive stimulation (i.e., a prior bayesian belief,
in the active inference terminology) shaped by prior experi-
ences and learning, even if the stimulus does not actively elic-
itate the subject. However, it is important to stress out that
in our model the reactive response is differentiated from the
expected outcome, which represents a value (more precisely
a function over internal physiological states) of the elicitation
that the brain (OFC) expects to experience from a given UCS.
In other words, expecting a given response does not coincide
with the “self-induction” of that response (see the Theorem in
Section 3.2.1). Furthermore, a variation of the active (sensory
or bottom-up) stimulation leads to an update or modulation of
the expected outcome and of the reactive emotional response
associated to the given stimulus.
6. On the emotional learning in classical conditioning and
UCS evaluation
In this Section the intrinsic differences and the relations be-
tween the mechanism of learning in classical conditioning and
that previously described for UCS revaluation learning are il-
lustrated. Then, it is shown that the Rescorla-Wagner equa-
tion for classical conditioning represents an approximation of
a specific case of emotional learning, since it can be derived
from our model, exploiting the stochastic Hebbian plasticity
rule [56, 57, 58, 60, 61] and taking into account specific ap-
proximations.
6.1. Introduction
In classical conditioning a CS, which is usually a neu-
tral/innocuous stimulus like a sound or a neutral visual cue, is
paired with a source of stimulation (e.g., an electric shock or
food), which is called UCS. Through repeated CS-UCS pair-
ings the CS can elicit a CR, called unconditioned response
(UCR), which is often similar to the response aroused by
the paired UCS [16, 17, 15]. When the UCS represents an
aversive stimulus, the CS-UCS pairing phenomenon is called
Pavlovian fear conditioning [16, 17]. In fear conditioning
with humans, an indirect estimate of the autonomic CR can
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be obtained measuring the changes in skin conductance level
(SCL), i.e. the so called skin conductance response (SCR).
Note, however, that in the analysis illustrated in the previous
sections, the UCR (i.e., the response elicited by a source of
stimulation) is not simply represented by indirect measure-
ments, such as SCR or the degree of salivation [15]. In fact,
it represents the response associated with the brain neural
populations elicited by the UCS and, consequently, includes
both non-emotional and emotional components. More specif-
ically, the UCR consists of a reactive response component
(yrem), a component due to the active (physical) stimulation
of emotional brain areas (yaem; see Eq. (3)) and a contribution
due to non-emotional stimulation (yne). For this reason, the
SCR acquired during a specific UCS stimulation, like an elec-
tric shock delivery, represents only an indirect and correlated
measure of the full response y expressed by Eqs. (1,2).
6.2. Different emotional learning mechanisms: for a primary
stimulus (UCS) and for a stimuli association (CS-UCS)
Even if both a CS and the paired UCS could be able to elic-
iting the same emotional reaction under some circumstances,
we argue they are qualitatively different entities and, most im-
portant, they might be learned through independent mecha-
nisms. In fact, on the one hand, through classical condition-
ing, which represents the learning of stimulus contingencies,
a CS acquires the capacity to elicit a response because it is
able to signal a likely occurrence of the UCS elicitation. On
the other hand, during implicit emotional learning (or UCS
evaluation), an element acquires the capacity to elicit a re-
sponse because a direct attribution of the outcome forward
that element (i.e., the UCS). Furthermore, the UCS outcome
revaluation (i.e., inflation and devaluation) is also driven by
implicit emotional learning.
Our claims are supported by various results available in the
literature [19, 20, 21, 18, 22]. In particular, [18], on the basis
of the results of various experiments in which inflation (UCR
increase) is performed after conditioning, came to the conclu-
sion that organisms form memories of a given UCS indepen-
dently of associative connections with a CS. Furthermore, in
[22] it is shown that the automatic response associated with
a UCS (SCR) changes through the revaluation of the UCS
itself in the absence of a variation in the probability of the
CS-UCS contingency. In [20] it is shown that a UCS infla-
tion, even during trials of conditioning extinction, results in
a larger CR. In [19], starting from contemporary models of
Pavlovian conditioning in humans, it is inferred that the pro-
cesses of CS-UCS association and UCS revaluation may be
largely independent. In particular, UCS revaluation can be
obtained in different ways (including verbal suggestions and
cognitive processes) and this modifies the strength of a CR in
the absence of any change in stimulus contingencies. More-
over, in the experiment reported in [21] thirty subjects were
randomly assigned to the inflation (UCR increase) or the de-
flation (UCR decrease) group, after a common classical con-
ditioning acquisition procedure (i.e., after experiencing the
same UCR strength). During the test session the indicators
of the CR intensity were SCRs and subjective aversion to the
conditioned stimulus (CS). The main results obtained in that
case can be summarized as follows: a) the CR strength mea-
sured by SCR was increased by the UCS inflation and de-
creased by the UCS deflation; b) the subjective aversiveness
to the CS was not sensitive to both manipulations of the UCS
intensity.
All the above mentioned results lead us to the following
conclusions: a) UCS revaluation occurs out of classical con-
ditioning and, implicitly, is able to modify the CR; b) the
strength of an autonomic CR might be influenced by the sub-
jective revaluation of a UCS, even when the CS-UCS con-
tingency remains the same; c) the probability of a CS-UCS
contingency (i.e., the CS prediction of the occurrence of a
UCS) through Pavlovian conditioning is independent of the
UCS revaluation. For these reasons, the UCS evaluation (and
revaluation) cannot be described by classical conditioning, so
that a specific model (i.e., a model for implicit emotional
learning or UCS revaluation, like that illustrated in Section
3) is necessary. These concepts are summarized in Fig. 4,
where the CS representation is related to the UCS represen-
tation through a connection whose strength is proportional to
the probability (or the belief ) of stimulus contingency, i.e. to
the probability Pr{UCS/CS} of the UCS stimulation condi-
tioned on the CS perception (briefly, the CS-UCS contingency
probability updated through the classical conditioning learn-
ing). It is worth noting that the probability Pr{UCS/CS} can
be increased through repetitive CS-UCS pairings or reduced
through a CS exposition without UCS elicitation. These prob-
ability/belief updatings reflects the CR during testing, accord-
ing to the classical conditioning learning (e.g., through the
results given by the Rescorla-Wagner equation [37]). Note
also that, in Fig. 4 the connection between the UCS and the
corresponding reactive response (iR, see Eqs. (10-11)) is high-
lighted.
The schematic representation illustrated in Fig. 4 is in
agreement with various recent results available in [55] and
[54]. In particular, the experimental results shown in [55]
have evidenced that the hippocampal engram memory (which
codes the contextual CS) is neutral and could freely associate
with either positive or negative emotions (through the UCS
representation) coded within the BLA. The connection be-
tween the contextual CS coded in the DG in the hyppocampus
and the UCS coded within the BLA could also be switched by
optogenetic technology manipulation. In practice, a CS-UCS
connection (denoted CS-UCS #1) can be switched to another
CS-UCS connection (denoted CS-UCS #2) of opposite va-
lence with respect to the first one (e.g., from a fear emotional
response to a reward emotional response). Indeed, the optoge-
netic reactivation of the DG engram-bearing cells during the
presentation of a UCS having valence opposite to the origi-
nal one strengthens the connectivity of these DG cells with
a new subset of BLA neurons, while weakening the connec-
tions established during the original learning [55]. From these
results it can be inferred that the CS memory engram is neu-
tral and that a CS can elicit an emotional reaction through the
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Figure 4: Schematic representation of the connections between a CS, the
paired UCS and the reactive response (iR) associated with the representa-
tion of the UCS itself. The reactive response iR is determined by the UCS
revaluation learning, instead the connection strength between CS and UCS
(ωCS−UCS) is determined by classical conditioning learning. Note that this
schematic representation is in agreement with the experimental results shown
in [54, 55].
connection to an UCS in the BLA. Additional results about
the effects of optogenetic manipulation are illustrated in [54],
where it is shown that the projection of a CS representation
onto a UCS ensemble in the BLA is required for the expres-
sion of a learned behavior, and that a CS (e.g., auditory or
olfactory) activates an UCS representation in the BLA to gen-
erate a learned behavior.
On the basis of our previous analysis we can state that
a CS elicitation, in turn, arouses a UCS reactive response
(iR) through a probabilistic (or belief) connection; further-
more, the value of the associated probability (or belief )
Pr{UCS/CS} is determined by classical conditioning (or even
by optogenetic manipulations [55]). For instance, at the end
of a conditioning acquisition, the probability Pr{UCS/CS} is
close to unity, since a CS predicts almost certainly the UCS
“imminent” elicitation. In this case a trial test produces a CR
expressed by Pr{UCS/CS} · iR ' iR and, consequently, given
by iR, which represents the reactive response, determined by
the amygdala reaction computed and stored within the amyg-
dala itself for the considered UCS (see Eqs. (10-11)). When
the value of Pr{UCS/CS} is between zero and unity, the CR
can be computed, for instance, through the Rescorla-Wagner
equation [37] and has to equal the product Pr{UCS/CS} · iR.
Therefore, at the end of a conditioning acquisition process,
there is no real difference, in terms of emotional reactive re-
sponse, if the subject perceives a CS alone or the paired UCS
alone (note that the term “response”, and not “behavior”, is
adopted here, since different intensities of the components of
the same emotional response may lead to distinct observable
behaviors; this issue is discussed in more detail below). This
is exemplified by the case of the dog observed at the end of a
conditioned acquisition in the conditioning experiments per-
formed by [15]; in fact, as far as the degree of salivation (i.e.,
the behavioral outcome due to the reactive response iR) was
concerned, perceiving the food (UCS) or perceiving the bell
(CS) which signalled the incoming food, did not really make
any difference (at least during the first trial, before the even-
tual extinction process). Note that this does not mean that the
CS becomes a substitute of the UCS, as initially supposed by
Pavlov in the so called “Stimulus-Substitution Theory”[109],
but that the CS triggers the reactive response (iR) through
the elicitation of the representation of the paired UCS within
the BLA (such an UCS elicitation through the CS perception
could be “partial” or “total” depending of the CS-UCS con-
nection strength; see Fig. 4 and [55]). In fact, as already
stated in Section 1, a CR and the corresponding UCR are not
identical, and only in specific conditions they could be similar
(in addition, a UCR, unlike a CR, may involve an active com-
ponent, X). In practice, the CR mimics the emotional compo-
nents elicited by the corresponding UCR (see Section 1.3 and
Remarks 5 and 4) but, generally speaking, with a lower inten-
sity, since the emotional system has to be stable (i.e., |α|< 1
is required; see H.6 in Section 3) and because the active com-
ponent (X) is no longer present in a purely reactive stimu-
lation. These considerations could be useful to explain the
fact that, in specific circumstances, the CR might represent
an opposite behavioral response with respect to the original
UCR; for instance, one unconditioned response to morphine
is represented by the reduced sensitivity to painful stimuli;
however, the conditioned response to stimuli associated with
morphine is represented by an increased sensitivity to painful
stimuli [159]. Phenomena like this could be explained con-
sidering that, generally speaking, the degree of elicitation of
a neuronal population (or the quantity of a specific type of
released neurotransmitter), due to a CR is smaller than the
original one generated by the corresponding UCR (e.g., an
active morphine administration) because of the above men-
tioned reasons. In particular, in neuropharmacology [84] it is
well known that an excitatory effect is commonly observed
with low concentrations of certain depressant drugs (e.g., al-
cohol, morphine, general anesthetics) because of either the
depression of inhibitory systems or a transient increase in the
release of excitatory transmitters (note that an excitatory state
occurs only with low concentrations of the depressant). Con-
sequently, within the complex CNS structure, different doses
of a specific receptor agonist or of a specific neurotransmit-
ter (i.e., different intensities of a specific component of a re-
sponse) could lead to very different (even opposite) observ-
able behavioral responses (see [84] for an exahustive review
about this topic).
Generally speaking, the typical scenario of a laboratory,
where the UCS is represented by an electric shock device,
which is permanently connected to the subject who does not
know when the electric shock will be effectively delivered
(unless signalled by the paired CS), leads to the impossibil-
ity of observing the emotional reactive response iR when the
source of stimulation (i.e., the UCS electric shock device in
the above mentioned scenario) is perceived by the subject. On
the contrary, we argue that, if the electric device is repeatedly
connected to the subject and disconnected from him/her in
each trial of electric stimulation, the subject perception of the
connected UCS device will elicit iR exactly as the CS percep-
tion does (after a conditioned acquisition for the CS). One
may argue that, in this case, the CS is represented by the
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electric shock device and that the electric shock delivery rep-
resents the UCS. Note, however, that in the considered sce-
nario the device represents a primary source of direct stimula-
tion (i.e., the UCS), whereas the shock delivery represents the
physical elicitation of that source, which supports the active
elicited response (i.e., the term X , see Eq. (27), or the term
yaem, see Eq. (3)). Note also that the same considerations
can be expressed when the primary stimulus is represented
by food [15], but do not hold for a neutral CS (e.g., a neu-
tral sound) signalling the UCS, since, in the last case, the CS
cannot substain a direct physical stimulation.
6.3. Conceptual difference between encoding a stimulus as
a primary stimulus (UCS) or as a conditioned stimulus
(CS)
Another important issue related to the differences in the
learning mechanisms analyzed in the previous Section con-
cerns the regions of the brain in which a CS and a UCS are
memorised. If a contextual CS is considered, the CS engram
and the the associated UCS are stored in the DG and in the
BLA, respectively [55]; however, it is still unclear if the same
rule applies to any non-contextual CS. Note also that phylo-
genetic fear-relevant stimuli, which are sources of stimulation
according to the definition provided in Section 1.2, are na-
tively stored in the mammial brain [2, 90].
In the following we summarise the most important exper-
imental results which concern the subliminal elicitation of
UCSs and the failure in subliminal elicitation of “previously-
neutral” conditioned CSs. Then, some important conclusions
about CS/UCS memorisation in specific regions of the brain
are inferred from them.
Subliminal elicitation of UCSs - In various experiments ac-
complished by Öhman et al. the awareness of visual stimuli
was blocked by means of backward masking [162, 176]. In
this case a target picture, representing a CS, is presented in an
short interval (lasting less than 50 ms) and is followed by the
presentation of a masking picture having similar luminosity
and colour features, and shown in the same area of the visual
field [177]. The presentation of this masking stimulus inter-
rupts the cortical processing of the target stimulus [178, 179];
hence, the target is invisible to the conscious and awareness
of the subject [180]. Moreover, in these experiments snake-
or spider- fearful subjects have been exposed to phylogenetic
fear-relevant masked stimuli (snakes or spiders) and neu-
tral masked stimuli (flowers and mushrooms). The acquired
experimental results have evidenced that only the phyloge-
netic stimuli were able to elicit an automatic SCR response
in phobic patients [90]. These findings agree with the hy-
pothesis about amygdala functionality proposed by LeDoux
[181, 126]. In fact, LeDoux has hypothized the existence of a
thalamic pathway to the amygdala; such a pathway would al-
low to automatically detect evolutionary prepared visual stim-
uli (like emotional faces, spiders, snakes, injuries). Note that
this model is also supported by other results acquired by dif-
ferent researchers that have employed masking in normal par-
ticipants [182, 170] or have observed brain activity in patients
affected by cortical blindness [183, 184]. According to this
model about amygdala functionality, the superior colliculus
stimulates the pulvinar nucleus of the thalamus, which then
arouses the amygdala [126, 185, 186]. This mechanism is
also supported by various brain imaging studies, which show
that masked facial stimuli activate the amygdala exactly as
masked pictures of threatening animals (such as snakes and
spiders) do [185]. This suggests that the salient features rep-
resenting an aversive source of stimulation could be stored in
the amygdala.
Failure in subliminal elicitation of “previously-neutral”
conditioned CSs - Other experimental results available in the
literature help us to understand what happens when a previous
neutral stimulus (i.e., a CS) conditioned on an active source
of stimulation (i.e., an UCS, like an electric shock) elicits a
subject, and in particular, if the CS representation is stored
in the same region as a phylogenetic aversive stimulus. Note
that, from a supraliminar perspective, both a purely reactive
UCS (e.g., a snake picture) and a previously conditioned CS
(e.g., a neutral picture conditioned to an electric shock) are
able to elicit a similar autonomic response, at least in sub-
jects suffering from a phobia towards the phylogenetic stim-
ulus represented on the exposed pictures [90]. A more inter-
esting case is that of subliminal perception, where only the
sub-cortical thalamic-amygdala pathway is elicited because
of the backward masking procedure described above. Vari-
ous results, acquired by Ohman and Soares in experiments
of differential conditioning, are available about this case [2].
In these experiments, a neutral stimulus, denoted CS+ (e.g.,
flowers or mushrooms) was paired with an electric shock UCS
(i.e., an active source of stimulation) during the acquisition
phase, and a different neutral stimulus, denoted CS-, was pre-
sented in the absence of the UCS. The results acquired dur-
ing the extinction phase have evidenced that the conditioned
CS+ was able to elicit a differential response (in particular,
an SCR response different from the baseline level of the CS-
response) only in the presence of supraliminar perception; on
the contrary, no differential SCR response has been observed
in the case of masked perception. This means that, unlike
the case of a reactive UCS (such as spiders, snakes or an-
gry faces), which is able to elicit an emotional reaction both
through supraliminarly or subliminally perception [90], a pre-
viously neutral conditioned CS elicits an emotional response
through supraliminar perception only. Therefore, the sub-
cortical thalamic-amygdala pathway (i.e., the so called high
road [126]) is unable to elicit a representation of the given
CS; this representation, instead, can be elicited only through
the thalamus-cortex-amygdala pathway. These considerarions
lead us to the conclusion that a CS representation might not
be directly stored within the amygdala (or, in any case, not in
the same region as an UCS representation) even if it predicts
an aversive-related stimulus.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the same condition-
ing paradigms have been used when employing biologically
fear-related (phylogenetic) stimuli [2], angry faces [162, 187],
and even ontogenetic pictures (i.e., pictures of cultural threats
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such as guns directed toward a subject) for CS+ and CS-. In
all the seen experiments, even if the employed CSs were con-
ditioned stimuli, they were not neutral, since they represented
reactive aversive emotional sources (i.e., reactive UCSs). This
qualitative difference with respect to a neutral CS (i.e., to
a CS not representing a reactive emotional source) reflects
the different behavioral results provided by the considered
experiments and, in particular explains, the fact that, even
during the masked extinction procedure, the CSs+ have been
able to elicit an emotional response through the sub-cortical
thalamic-amygdala pathway.
The experimental results illustrated above have lead us to
the following conclusions. It is likely that any representa-
tion of an emotional source of stimulation, such as an innate
biological fear-related threat (in other words, a phylogenetic
source) or a cultural threat (i.e., an ontogenetic source), is
able to elicit an emotional response through the sub-cortical
thalamic-amygdala pathway; hence, this source is expected
to be stored in a rapid access site of the amygdala. On the
contrary, in the case of classical conditioning, a previously-
neutral conditioned CS is unable to elicit a reactive emo-
tional response through the thalamic-amygdala pathway; con-
sequently, it should be stored in other regions of the brain or
in a region of the amygdala different from that employed for
primary stimuli. Therefore, which is the qualitative difference
between a reactive UCS (e.g., an emotional picture) and a pre-
vious neutral CS conditioned through classical conditioning?
Both UCS and CS are able to elicit similar responses supral-
iminarly, but such stimuli are stored in different brain regions.
We argue that the main qualitative difference between these
two cases is represented by how initially the stimulus has ac-
quired the capacity to elicit an aversive emotional response,
that is by how the stimulus has been encoded (as a primary
stimulus or as a conditioned stimulus). In fact, a phylogenetic
source might be innate and natively stored within the amyg-
dala; moreover, an ontogenetic emotional source, such as a
gun [1], might be acquired through learning mechanisms dif-
ferent from those of classical conditioning. It is reasonable
to suppose that a generic UCS, like an electric shock device
or a weapon, is acquired through an active and direct stim-
ulation (or even cognitively, exploiting aversive experiences
of other individuals through social fear learning [188, 189]);
consequently, the corresponding outcome will be directly at-
tributed to that active source. In brief, a UCS represents a
stimulus able to directly elicit a response (i.e., it is encoded as
a primary stimulus); on the contrary, a CS does not have such
a capability and its role is limited to statistical signalling of an
incoming UCS. We also argue that the experiments described
above should also lead to similar conclusions if a new active
source of stimulation (i.e., an UCS which does not represent
a phylogenetic threatening stimulus nor an ontogenetic stim-
ulus), experimentally generated, is adopted. In particular, the
correctness of the last claim could be assessed by modifying
the experimental procedure described in [1]; in particular, this
would require the following two steps: a) introducing an ad-
ditional phase in the experimental procedure described in [1],
in order to generate (starting from a neutral stimulus) a newly
ontogenetic source of stimulation for a group (through UCS
evaluation), and a new conditioned stimulus for another group
(through classical conditioning learning); b) analyzing the be-
haviors of the two different groups at the end of the learning
procedure. We expect to find out that both groups will be able
to show an emotional reaction (e.g., an SCR) through a supral-
iminar stimulus perception, whereas only the group who has
encoded the stimulus as a primary stimulus (i.e., as UCS) will
be able to show an emotional reaction through subliminal per-
ception (i.e., through the thalamo-amygdala pathway). If such
a result will be obtained, it will also definitively prove that the
mechanism through which the aversive object has been en-
coded (i.e. through classical conditioning acquisition or by
direct or implicit response attribution) makes the difference
and determines the brain region in which the stimulus repre-
sentation will be stored.
In the absence of further experimental results, we believe,
on the basis of the existing literature, that the only reasonable
claim that can be made about the nature of a coded stimulus,
is given by the following remark.
Remark 6.
If a subliminally perceived cue elicits an emotional reac-
tion, then this means the cue representation is stored within
the amygdala and it represents a source of emotional stimula-
tion (i.e., an UCS).
Note that this remark is useful when analysing experimen-
tal results in which a subliminally perceived stimulus elicits a
measurable emotional reaction.
6.4. Derivation of the Rescorla-Wagner Equation for Classi-
cal Conditioning and a corrected formulation
In this section it is shown how the Rescorla-Wagner equa-
tion for CS-UCS Pavlovian conditioning can be derived start-
ing from our model about the implicit learning of an UCS
outcome.
Our derivation relies on the assumption that the CS-UCS
synaptic connections are governed by the mechanisms of
stochastic Hebbian plasticity [56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61]. This
hypothesis is supported by both some experimental results
shown in [55] and [54], and other models relying on the
fact that a CS-UCS pairing entails the Hebbian potentiation
of the CS inputs onto the UCS representations in the BLA
[190, 191, 125]. In practice, Hebbian learning is based on
the idea that synapses between neurons being simultaneously
active become stronger. Consequently, “neurons that fire to-
gether could wire together” through an increase in synaptic
efficacy mediated by long term potentiation (LTP, see [192]);
on the contrary, a decrease in synaptic efficacy is mediated
by long term depression (LTD) [193]. In particular, in [55] it
is shown that the optogenetic reactivation of the DG engram-
bearing cells coding a contextual CS, during the presentation
of a new UCS having valence opposite to the original UCS
(which was previously paired with the CS itself), strengthens
the connectivity of these cells with a new subset of the BLA
neurons, while weakening the connections established during
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the original learning process. In other words, the simultane-
ous activation of a CS neural representation and of a new UCS
strengthens a CS-UCS connection (through LTP) and, at the
same time, weakens the connection (through LTD) between
the CS and the previously associated UCS, which is not si-
multaneously active.
As illustrated in [194], the main task of the sensory system
is to detect (and model) correlations [195] through neuron
firing, in order to exploit ‘suspicious coincidences’ in com-
plex incoming information. These correlations may form the
‘objects’ or ‘features’ of the representations of any stimulus.
After being detected by primary sensory areas, such correla-
tions can be used for binding elementary features into more
elaborate percepts. These binding phenomena [194, 196] are
based on the concept of neuronal assemblies, which are usu-
ally defined as a group of neurons that transiently undergo
synchronous firing [194, 59]. This transient synchrony could
form the basis of a common input to later stages of integration,
and so promote responses that are specific to a given ensemble
of features [197]. These mechanisms rely on the fact that cor-
tical neurons are very efficient at detecting correlations [198],
as evidenced by computational models [199]. On the basis of
these results it can be assumed that that the representation of
a CS and that of its associated UCS are formed by a neuronal
assembly, which, in turn, is composed by cells assemblies rep-
resenting specific features, and that connections between the
CS and the UCS neuronal assemblies are established through
Hebbian plasticity. The implications of this assumption are
analysed in the following part of this Section, where a new
sequence of trials, involving CS-UCS-subject interactions, is
taken into consideration.
In these trials we assume that: a) the source of stimula-
tion (UCS) has been acquired (i.e., properly coded as a source
stimulus), and the emotional learning for the UCS source has
encoded the reactive response iR (which can be assumed to
be equal to α ·X , with X representing the active induced re-
sponse); b) a new cue (denoted CS) becomes paired with the
source UCS in the first trial and, hence, an UCR associated
with this UCS is elicited; c) in the first trial (i.e., for n = 1)
the strength ω(1)CS−UCS (ranging from 0 to 1, as evidenced be-
low) of the CS-UCS connection (which, in turn, is related to
iR; see Fig. 4) is equal to zero (in other words, no connection
has been established before the start of the pairing process); d)
the CS remains the same during all the considered trial; e) the
UCS elicitation is signalled by the CS presentation only and
not by the UCS presentation (e.g., the electric shock device is
permanently attached to the subject and the shock delivery is
signalled exclusively by the CS presentation). In the follow-
ing analysis the response elicited by the CS, previously named
CR, is denoted yCS. Then, in the first trial, an unexpected ac-
tive UCS elicitation (X) generates the emotional response (see
Eq. (30))
y(1)UCS = X , (46)
which is what was expected for the source UCS. However,
since the UCS occurs unexpectedly in time, a reactive con-
tribution due to the contrast effect (see Section 3.5) should
be produced (provided that no previous conditioned cue or
direct UCS perception signals the active stimulation). Never-
theless, in Section 3.5 it has been shown that successive un-
expected UCS elicitations do not entail the computation of
an error signal, but certainly involve the elicitation of a re-
active response due to the contrast effect, (quantified by the
product K ·X). However, without any loss of generality, this
reactive contribution can be neglected; furthermore, it can be
noted that, during conditioning trials, this contrast contribu-
tion will vanish (since no “unexpected stimulation” occurs as
the CS becomes progressively able to predict the UCS occur-
rence) and in place of this contribution the reactive response
associated with the UCS (iR) will be elicited as the CS is per-
ceived (see Fig. 4). Even if no error signal has to be estimated
for the given UCS source during the first trial, the contempo-
rary presence of the CS during the UCS elicitation is sufficient
to generate some synaptic connections between the represen-
tation of the CS and that of the UCS through the stochastic
Hebbian rule; consequently, the strength of this link is poten-
tiated through LTP. In the following it is also assumed that
individual plastic synapses exhibit a binary behavior, since
they can be in a depressed state or in a potentiated state.
For this reason, the strength of a set of plastic synapses is
quantified by the fraction of synapse population in the poten-
tiated state [56, 57, 58, 60, 61]; this fraction is called synaptic
strength and in the n-th trial is denoted as ω(n)CS−UCS for the set
of synapses from the neurons representing the CS stimulus
onto the encoding neurons for the UCS.
The mechanism through which plastic synapses learn cue-
outcome contingencies through stochastic reward-dependent
Hebbian modifications is illustrated in [61]. In practice,
whenever the neurons encoding a given CS are simultane-
ously elicited at the activation of the UCS neurons, the plas-
tic synapses from CS onto UCS in the depressed state make
a transition to the potentiated state with probability αˆ+ (this
quantity is called potentiation rate); otherwise, if the CS is
elicited without the contingent UCS elicitation, they make a
transition in the reverse direction with probability αˆ− (this
quantity is called depression rate). It is worth mentioning
that the parameters αˆ+ and αˆ− are ofter called learning rates
[60] and that they depend on the firing rate of the postsynaptic
neurons of the CS and on the state of the UCS (which is ei-
ther active or non-active, that is eliciting or not eliciting UCS).
The firing rate is low for the neurons which do not represent
the perceived CS and, on the contrary, is high for the neu-
rons encoding the CS. Hence, if the CS features are modified
during the trials, the learning rates change too. In the fol-
lowing, however, we assume that the CS perception does not
change during the trials (see H.4 in Section 3.1), so that the
depression and potentiation rates remain constant (and differ-
ent from zero). It is worth pointing out that the parameters αˆ+
and αˆ− are scalar quantities (each of them would be replaced
by a vector having identical components if multiple emotional
components were considered in the evaluation of the reactive
response) and they are not related to the parameter α defined
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in Section 3.2 (i.e., α becomes also a vector, but with different
components, if multiple emotional components are taken into
consideration).
On the basis of the plastic probabilistic Hebbian rule illus-
trated above, in the n-th trial the synaptic strenght is updated
as
ω(n)CS−UCS = ω
(n−1)
CS−UCS + αˆ+ ·
(
1−ω(n−1)CS−UCS
)
(47)
during a conditioned acquisition (through LTP), and as
ω(n)CS−UCS = ω
(n−1)
CS−UCS− αˆ− ·ω(n−1)CS−UCS (48)
during the extinction phase (through LTD). Note that the sec-
ond term in the right-hand side of (47) describes the change
related to the transition of synapses in the depressed state,
since a fraction
(
1−ω(n−1)CS−UCS
)
of synapses are potentiated
with probability αˆ+.In the following, we assume, without any
loss of generality, that the potentiation and depression rate are
equal (i.e. αˆ+= αˆ−= αˆ). Then, during acquisition the synap-
tic potentiation of the CS-UCS connection can be evaluated as
follows:
ω(n)CS−UCS = ω
(n−1)
CS−UCS + αˆ ·
(
1−ω(n−1)CS−UCS
)
(49)
where the term αˆ denotes the learning rate, it represents a
scalar value (or a vector with all equals components if more
than one emotional components are involved in the reactive
response iR).
The synaptic strenght ω(n)CS−UCS evaluated on the basis of
Eq. (47) can be exploited to assess the response y(n)CS to the
presentation of the CS alone in the n-trial; in fact, the intensity
of the CR is determined by the product of ω(n)CS−UCS with the
reactive response iR associated with the paired UCS, i.e. by
y(n)CS = ω
(n)
CS−UCS · iR. (50)
Then, substituting (47) in (50) yields the expression
y(n)CS = iR ·ω(n−1)CS−UCS + αˆ+ ·
(
iR− iR ·ω(n−1)CS−UCS
)
, (51)
which can be easily put in the form
y(n)CS = y
(n−1)
CS + αˆ+ ·
(
iR− y(n−1)CS
)
. (52)
It is easy to prove that the last formula coincides with the well
known Rescorla-Wagner equation for Pavlovian conditioning
[36, Sec 1, p. 365, eq. (1-2)],
V n+1x =V
n
x +αxβ1 (λ1−V ntotal) (53)
for the case in which a single CS is considered; in fact, Eq.
(53) is obtained from (52) if αˆ+ and iR are replaced with
αx · β1 and λ , respectively, and y(n−1)CS is assumed to repre-
sent the associative strength V nx . Note that the V
n
total coincides
with the term V nx if a single CS (denoted x) exists; otherwise
it represents the sum of the associative strengths of all CSs
(including x).
Equation (52) deserves the following comments:
• If the overall CS is composed by N distinct CSs (i.e.,
a CSs compound is considered), the synaptic strength
between the compound and its paired UCS can be still
computed on the basis of (49). However, in this case, a
fraction of the overall strength should be associated with
each component of the compound CS (such a fraction
depends on the nature of the considered CS and its neu-
ral representation). Then, the contribution to the synap-
tic strength originating from the k-th component (with
k = 1,2, ...,K) can be evaluated as (see ((47))
ω(n)CSk−UCS = ω
(n−1)
CSk−UCS + αˆk ·
(
1−ω(n−1)totCS−UCS
)
, (54)
where ω(n)CSk−UCS and ω
(n−1)
totCS−UCS represent the synaptic
strength originating from the k-th CS and the overall
synaptic strength originating from the compound, rispec-
tively. The last formula is motivated by the fact that each
component shares the same full synaptic connection in
reaching the neural representation of the stored UCS. It
is also worth mentioning that multiplying both sides of
(54) by iR produces
y(n)CS = y
(n−1)
CS + αˆ+ ·
(
iR− y(n−1)total
)
, (55)
which represents the Rescorla-Wagner equation for the
case of a CS compound [36, Sec 1, p. 365, eq. (1-
2)]. From Eq. (54) it can also inferred that, if a CS or
a compound have been conditioned to a UCS, so that
their synaptic strength is equal to unity, when a new CS
is added to the compund and paired with the given UCS
no connection updating can occur, this phenomenon is
known as blocking effect [36].
• From a mathematical perspective Eqs. (47) and (54) can
be intepreted as simple rules for updating a conditional
probability. In fact, the synaptic strength ω(n)CS−UCS can
be interpreted as the probability (or the belief) of that the
event of UCS elicitation occurs conditioned on the fact
that the given subject perceives the considered CS.
• During the extinction process, the CS is repeatedly
shown to the subject without UCS pairings; conse-
quently, (48) holds and the CS response yCS tends
asymptotically to zero.
• A straightforward consequence of Eq. (55) is repre-
sented by the fact that the maximum response obtained
at the end of the conditioning process asymptotically ap-
proaches iR, which represents exactly the emotional re-
active response associated with the given source of stim-
ulation (i.e., with the UCS). In turn, the reactive response
iR can be increased (inflation) or decreased (devaluation)
by UCS re-evaluation (e.g., through a variation of the ac-
tive stmulation X)), independently of the Pavlovian con-
ditioning process.
• From the last point it can be inferred that, at the end
of the acquisition of a CS-UCS Pavlovian conditioning,
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there is no difference, in terms of emotional response,
if the CS only or the UCS only is perceived in the ab-
sence of an active elicitation. This claim holds only in a
supraliminal stimulus elicitation (see Section 6.3).
• Actually, since the CS-UCS connection strength in-
creases during conditioning acquisition, the reactive re-
sponse iR associated with the UCS should also become
stronger. As a matter of fact, the emotional response
y(n)UCS in the n-th acquisition trial is due to the elicitation
of the CS response (i.e., to y(n)CS = iR ·ω(n)CS−UCS due to
the partial activation of the UCS representation from the
CS) and to the active UCS stimulation (i.e., to the term
X due, for instance, to an electric shock stimulation; see
Eq. (46)), since the overall response is attributed to the
UCS (which represents, unlike the CS, a direct source
of stimulation). This last claim is supported by the ex-
perimental results obtained through optogenetic manip-
ulations [55], which show that a memory engram cod-
ing a CS is “emotionally neutral” and could freely asso-
ciate with different emotional responses through the cor-
responding UCS representations coded within the BLA.
Therefore, it is easy to prove that the associated reac-
tive component iR grows from the initial value α ·X to
the value α · (X + i(n−1)R ·ω(n)CS−UCS) because of the error
signal (computed as the difference between the expected
response yUCS and the experienced outcome). For these
reasons, the process of implicit UCS inflation originates
from an indirect contribution of the CS; in fact, the CS,
signalling the UCS, is able to elicit the reactive response
(iR; see Fig. 4) associated with the UCS itself. There-
fore, iR does not remain constant over consecutive acqui-
sition trials, as assumed by the original Rescorla-Wagner
model, but evolves according to the recursive equation
i(n)R = α ·
(
X + i(n−1)R ·ω(n)CS−UCS
)
(56)
The last formula shows that the CR intensity influences
the intensity of the unconditioned response. This result is in
agreement with some experimental results [62] (see also [36]
and articles therein), evidencing the dependence of asymp-
totic responding on CS intensity and US intensity; this rep-
resents one of the results unpredicted by the Rescorla-Wagner
model [36]. It is also important to point out, however, that
the changes of iR over successive trials could be really small,
since the term α · iR in Eq. (56), which is smaller than α2 ·X
(since 0<ωCS−UCS < 1), is negligible with respect to the term
α ·X (since |α| < 1). Moreover, it is easy to prove that the
asymptotic value of iR is αX/(1−α), which is greater than
the initial value αX . This leads to the conclusion that, since
the value of the parameter α is influenced by the selected CS
(if the impact of other factors, such as internal psysiological
states and the selected UCS, is deemed constant), different
CSs may result in distinct asymptotic values of iR (and conse-
quently of yCS; see Eq. (50)).
In summary, we propose to adopt a new classical condi-
tioning model (valid for a discrete time scale), which encom-
passes the Rescorla-Wagner model and coincides with it only
under specific conditions and restrictions. If a single CS is
assumed to simplify the notation, this extended model is de-
scribed by Eq. (47) when the given CS is paired with an UCS,
Eq. (48) when the CS is presented alone, by Eq. (56), which
has to be updated only in the CS-UCS pairing trials (since iR
does not vary if the CS is presented alone), and, finally, by the
formula
y(n)CS = ω
(n)
CS−UCS · i(n−1)R , (57)
which expresses the yCS updating.
Note that Eqs. (56) and (57) hold for n ≥ 2 and that the
initial conditions
ω(1) = 0 (58)
i(1)R = α ·X (59)
y(1)CS = 0 (60)
and
y(1)UCS = X (61)
should be adopted when employing them. Our extended
model provides a more general and accurate description of
the emotional response during conditioning than the original
Rescorla-Wagner model for at least three different reasons.
First of all, it includes the contributions of both the active
response (X) due to the elicitation of the physical UCS and
the reactive response associated with the UCS representation
within the BLA (iR). Moreover, the recursive equations de-
scribing it are causal unlike those representing the Rescorla-
Wagner model. Note that causality ensures that the currently
computed response depends only on the past and present val-
ues of the stimulus and the response itself, but not on their
future values; unluckily, this does not occur for the Rescorla-
Wagner model since the evaluation of the current response re-
quires the knowledge of the final asymptotic response (i.e., the
term λ in Eq. (53)), which is actually unknown to the brain.
Finally, in our model the CS-UCS synaptic strength (asso-
ciative learning) and the consequent UCS inflation are jointly
considered: the model shows that classical conditioning learn-
ing influences the reactive response associated with the paired
UCS; this is due to the misattribution of the CR contribution
forward the UCS response. Hence, generally speaking, classi-
cal conditioning (i.e., the CS-UCS contingency or associative
learning) and implicit emotional learning (i.e., UCS revalu-
ation) are different learning mechanisms, but are closely re-
lated; in particular, classical conditioning, is able to indirectly
determine the inflation of the UCS. It is also interesting to
note that the asymptotic value
i(∞)R = α · y∗ =
α ·X
1−α (62)
of iR provided by Eq. (56) is identical to the asymptotic reac-
tive response resulting from implicit learning (see Eq. (30)).
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This means that perceiving the source of stimulation (i.e., the
UCS) or perceiving a signalling conditioned stimulus before
the administration of the active stimulation (X) leads to the
same asymptotic reactive response to the given UCS. How-
ever, the CS is only a means to strenghten the reactive re-
sponse associated with its paired UCS, and classical condi-
tioning represents a secondary (indirect) mechanism of emo-
tional learning. In fact, the CS remains neutral [55] and the
corresponding CR (i.e., yCS) is related to the synaptic connec-
tions between the CS representation and the UCS representa-
tion in the BLA, which, in turn, is connected to the reactive
response which has been strenghtened through UCS revalua-
tion (because of a misattribution of the CR). It is also worth
mentioning that direct implicit emotional learning (i.e., per-
ceiving the UCS at every trial in place of the CS) allows to
achieve the asymptotic response expressed by Eq. (62) in
fewer trials than classical conditioning, since in last case the
initial value of the synaptic strength ωCS−UCS able to elicit the
UCS is smaller than unity and increases with trials.
It is also important to note that the proposed model is able
to properly predict the fact that, if the CS is presented with
a UCS of lower intensity (i.e., with an active component
X
′
< X) during a generic trial, the reactive response iR will
be reduced by the influence of the error signal and, at the
same time, the synaptic strength ωCS−UCS will be indepen-
dently increased (or will remain constant if the asymptotic
value has been already reached), since the synaptic connec-
tions between the CS and the UCS are still reinforced by the
stimuli contingency (i.e., through associative learning, rather
than through an error signal computation), even in the pres-
ence of a negative error signal. This result is in agreement
with the experimental evidencies shown in Section 6.2; note,
however, that classical conditioning may determine, indirectly
(through the elicitation of the reactive response and its mis-
attribution forward the UCS), an error signal. It is also im-
portant to mention that classical conditioning experiments in-
volving the contingency of two neutral stimuli (e.g., the pair-
ing of a neutral tone and a neutral light; see [200] and articles
therein) are in agreement with our results, since these show
that the associative learning can occur with the pairing of two
neutral (not emotional nor motivational) stimuli and, hence,
with no computation of any error signal. From these results
and considerations it can be inferred that the associative learn-
ing is not driven by the emotional system, on the countrary the
implicit UCS revaluation learning is driven by the emotional
system through the computation of the emotional error sig-
nals.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the asymptotic reactive
response associated with a given UCS cannot be increased
by means of the conditioning acquisition of a new CS (called
CS#2) . In fact, if the CS#2 becomes paired with the UCS,
in the initial trials the total outcome yUCS is smaller than the
asymptotic value reached during the previous conditioning
due to the first CS (CS#1); this is due to the fact that, at the
beginning, the connection strength ωCS#2−UCS is smaller than
unity. Therefore, in the initial trials a negative error signal will
lower the reactive response iR and, in the successive trials, a
positive error signal will increase it again untill the asymptotic
value in Eq. (62) is reached.
6.4.1. Stochastic Hebbian rule in more complex pattern
When complicated CS patterns are conditioned to an UCS,
Hebbian learning leads to self-organizing networks of synap-
tic connections. Such networks are able to represent compli-
cated statistical regularities characterizing the considered en-
vironment [201, 61]; for instance, temporal CS-UCS relations
can be also learned assuming the time variable (and temporal
relations between stimuli) as a contextual CS [202]. We argue
that, even during the implicit emotional learning of the UCS,
the temporal trend of the stimulation represents an important
contextual information, which might be coded and stored. In
addition, we feel that more complicated Hebbian networks si-
multaneously taking into account several variables could be
able to predict more sophisticated phenomena related to clas-
sical conditioning paradigms (e.g., second order conditioning
[36]).
6.4.2. Conditioning to a reactive source stimulus
We argue that the following three possible events can occur
when a CS is conditioned to a purely reactive UCS (i.e., an
UCS for which no active component elicitation is expected,
e.g., an emotional picture): 1) a simple associative connec-
tion CS-UCS is generated; 2) the CS is misattributed to be the
source of the elicited response, so becoming a new (and inde-
pendent) reactive source like the original UCS, so that a new
reactive response, equal (but independent) to the original iR,
is generated and associated to the CS; furthermore, this misat-
tribution process could occur even during the presentation of
the CS alone after conditioning, since the reactive elicitation
equals to ωCS−UCS · iR (see Eq. (50)) could be misattributed
forward the CS, in this case the reactive response being asso-
ciated with CS corresponds to the quantity ωCS−UCS · iR; 3) a
combination of the previous two events happens. Moreover, if
one of the two last mentioned events occurs, the conditioned
CS will become an inextinguishable element of emotional re-
action. In summary, we argue that a CS conditioned to a re-
active UCS can become an inextinguishable reactive source
of stimulation through different mechanisms; furthermore, a
given stimulus could act as both a CS and a primary stimulus
(UCS) at the same time, owning even opposite valenced po-
tentials; for instance, the considered stimulus could be condi-
tioned to an aversive UCS and, at the same time, could operate
as an appetitive source of reactive stimulation.
6.5. On the conditioned inhibitor
In this Section the quantitative description of the so called
conditioned inhibitor is developed on the basis of our theory.
Operationally speaking, a conditioned inhibitor is a CS that
passes a negative summation and retardation tests for condi-
tioned inhibition (see [36] and articles therein). A CS is said
to pass a negative summation test for conditioned inhibition if,
when it is presented together with a conditioned excitor (i.e., a
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CS wich has been paired with an UCS), it reduces the level of
conditioned responding to that excitor that would otherwise
occur. Moreover, a CS is said to pass a retardation test for
conditioned inhibition if it requires a larger number of pair-
ings with the UCS to become an effective conditioned excitor
than those required if the CS were novel [36] (i.e., if the CS
had not undergone inhibitory training).
The most widely used method to create a conditioned in-
hibitor consists of not reinforcing the intended inhibitory CS
in the presence of another cue that itself has been previously
reinforced [36]. Let us analyze the conditioned inhibition on
the basis of the model we proposed for emotional learning.
One of the main assumptions made in the development of
our model is that the functions involved in the computation of
emotional reactions are time invariant (see Section 2.4). Un-
der this assumption, if in a sequence of trials an UCS elicits
a subject that always maintains the same internal physiologi-
cal states (for instance, this case is exemplified by a dog that
undergoes some conditioninng trials, pairing a ring and some
food, in which the intensity of its hunger remains the same),
the only source of variation of the response (and of the ex-
pected outcome) is represented by the learning process. For
this reasons, if the expected outcome for an UCS after the first
elicitation trial is equal to X , the reactive response associated
with the UCS (iR) is equal to αX (see Eqs. (11, 19 and 20)),
whereas the asymptotic value is equal to αX/(1−α) (see Eq.
(31)). Hence, in both cases, the reactive response iR is ex-
pressed by
iR = α · yexpected . (63)
that is by the product of the parameter α depending on the
amygdala and the system chain functions (see Eqs. (19-21))
with the expected outcome.
Generalizing the last consideration leads to the conclusion
that, if the expected outcome for a specific UCS is also in-
fluenced by internal physiological states (and not only by the
learning process), the reactive response associated with the
considered UCS varies according to Eq. (63). From a neu-
rophysiological perspective, we argue that the last result is
motivated by the fact that the expected outcome and the bi-
ological functions determining the reactive response are con-
trolled by the same internal physiological states (the degree
of hunger in the example mentioned above). In practice, if
food is presented to a satiated dog, the expected outcome (i.e.,
the rewarding response which is expected to occur) is very
weak and, consequently, the associated reactive response will
be weak too (e.g., a low degree of salivation will be observed).
However, this phenomenon does not lead to the extinction (or
devaluation) of the UCS, since no error signal is computed;
this is due to the fact that the expected outcome coincides
with the experienced outcome (actually, in this case the dog
could even avoid to eat and hence to experience the actual
UCS elicitation). It is also reasonable to assume that, if a tone
(CS) is presented together with some food (UCS) to a sati-
ated dog, the CS-UCS association will be reinforced even if
no emotional response occurs, and, in any cases, no CS ex-
tinction occurs. In other words, the perception of the UCS in
a trial in which the internal physiological states of the subject
lead to a low expected response (or even to a response equal
to zero for the considered UCS) does not lead to the extinction
of the UCS itself (nor to a correction of the reactive response
through the computation of an error signal); furthermore, the
paired presentation of a previously paired CS (excitor) with
the considered UCS, during the aforementioned conditions,
does not lead to extinction of the CS.
On the basis of the considerations illustrated above the fol-
lowing quantitative analysis of a conditioned inhibitor can be
derived. We argue that an inhibitory CS (denoted CSi in the
following) represents a stimulus whose neural representation
is directly connected to an inhibitory reactive response, de-
noted iRi (in other words, a causal attribution of the inhibi-
tion effect forward the CSi occurs, so that the CSi is encoded
as a source of stimulation by the emotional system). For in-
stance, if an excitor CS previously conditioned with an elec-
tric shock delivery (characterized by the intensity X) is paired
with a new CSi and, simultaneously, with an intensity of elec-
tric stimulation equal to zero, the CSi becomes a conditioned
inhibitor and, more specifically, becomes connected to an in-
hibitory (e.g., negative) reactive response iRi = α(−X). If
these considerations are generalized like in the previous case
of an excitor source of stimulation (see Eq. (63)), the reactive
response associated with the CSi is a function of the expected
active stimulation which has to be inhibited, so that
iRi = α(−yexpected). (64)
On the basis of the last result it should be expected that, if
a new CS excitor (denoted CS2 in the following), predicting
an UCS stimulation intensity weaker than the one predicted
by the conditioned excitor which has been employed for the
inhibitory conditioning (to obtain the CSi), called X
′
(with
X
′
<X , where X represents the UCS intensity predicted by the
conditioned excitor employed for the inhibitory conditioning,
denoted CS1 in the following), or, equivalently, conditioned
with the active stimulation X at a lower reinforcement rate
(which results in the inequality ω ′CS2−UCS < ωCS1−UCS) and
such that ω ′CS2−UCS ·X = X
′
, is presented in compound with
the CSi, the reactive inhibition becomes equal to α(−X ′).
More specifically, we argue that the CSi is able to propor-
tionally inhibit only the CSs excitors signalling an expected
excitatory outcome equal or smaller than X ; furthermore, the
inhibition for expected outcomes greater than X remains equal
to −αX , since the emotional system does not know how the
inhibitor behaves for larger excitatory intensities.
Conversely, if during inhibitory conditioning the CSi has
been obtained through a partial reduction of the active UCS
elicitation, say from X to X −4X , the inhibitory reactive re-
sponse is able to proportionally inhibit only an expected out-
come comprised between X−4X and X , but not smaller than
X −4X ; this is due to the fact that the emotional system has
learned that an outcome smaller than X −4X represents a
residual response which cannot be inhibited. For these rea-
sons, for the last mentioned case, the reactive inhibition re-
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sponse can be expressed as
iRi =−α
[
yexpected− (X−4X)
]
(65)
when X−4X ≤ yexpected ≤ X , and as
iRi =−α ·4X (66)
when yexpected ≥ X , and, finally, as
iRi = 0 (67)
when yexpected < X−4X .
From the above results, it is easily inferred that the CSi
inhibitory effect depends not only on the expected excitatory
outcome (i.e., yexpected), but also on the inhibition intensity
and on the residual (not inhibited) response generated during
the learning process (i.e., −4X and X −4X , respectively).
These concepts are summarised in Fig. 5.
It is worth noting that, if a previously conditioned CSi
(which it has to remember is coded as a source of stimula-
tion) is presented alone (i.e., without a paired UCS or CS), an
extinction cannot occur since the expected outcome is equal
to zero; consequently, the associated reactive response iRi is
equal to zero too (see Eqs. (64) and (67)) and no error sig-
nal is computed. Moreover, if the conditioning inhibition has
occured by pairing a CS excitor, the CSi and an UCS stimula-
tion intensity lower than the one employed during CS excita-
tory conditioning, the presentation of the CSi alone can even
strenghten its inhibitory effect. This is due to the fact that the
synaptic connection between the CSi and the CS, which in
turn is connected to the UCS representation (which is excita-
tory) is extinguished (or weakened) by repeated presentations
of the CSi alone [65]. This effect, indeed, can also be obtained
by extinguishing the CS employed in the inhibitory condition-
ing [65]; this experimental evidence supports the existence of
the associative connections CSi-CS-UCS. For these reasons,
the CSi could exert even an excitatory response when paired
with a new CS2 (i.e., a different CS than that empolyed during
the inhibitory conditioning) predicting (i.e., signalling) an ex-
citatory outcome smaller than X −4X (i.e., smaller than the
residual excitatory response generating during the inhibitory
conditioning) [64, 65]. In fact, in this case, the reactive in-
hibitory response iRi associated with CSi is equal to zero (see
Eq.(67)), and the associative synaptic connections, generated
during inhibitory conditioning, (CSi-CS-UCS) from CSi to
CS (which in turn is connected to the excitatory UCS, which
is associated with the reactive response iR) determine the re-
active response equal to ωCSi−CS ·ωCS−UCS · iR (if not extin-
guished through repeated presentations of the CSi alone, or
through the original CS extinction). All the results illustrated
above, namely the impossibility of extinguishing a CS in-
hibitor through its repeated presentation (or even its inhibitory
strengthen), and the fact that the inhibitory effect of the con-
ditioned inhibitor (CSi) depends on the expected outcome, on
the UCS intensity decrease and on the residual (i.e., not in-
hibited) response generating during the inhibitory condition-
ing process (see Eqs. (64-67)), are supported by experimental
results illustrated in a growing body of literature (e.g., see
[203, 64, 36, 204, 205]) and reviewed in [65]. It is worth to
mention that the above obtained results cannot be predicted by
the simple Rescorla-Wagner model [36], nor by the classical
conditioning theory.
Finally, as in the case of some phylogenetic “excitatory”
stimuli (i.e., prepared biological and evolutionary fear rele-
vant stimuli, such as angry faces, spiders, snakes and oth-
ers) which are coded in the mammalian amygdala since birth
[162, 1, 2, 90], we argue that also phylogenetic inhibitors
could exist since birth; in particular, the food may represent
a phylogenetic inhibitor of hunger (which in turn depends on
physiological internal states). The last interpretation is in line
with the observation that when the degree of hunger is rela-
tively high, the reactive response intensity iRi associated with
food representations is particularly strong (see Eq. (64)). It
is also important to note that the inhibitory effect originated
by consuming food, could lead to a rewarding experience also
because the contrast effect. This last consideration is sup-
ported by the Berlyne’s “arousal jag” theory [206], which
postulates that a drop from unusually high level of arousal
(which is experienced as unpleasant; represented by an high
level of hunger in the example mentioned above) to a low level
is associated with a feeling of pleasure [207]. This effect is
described in more detail (also from a quantitative perspective)
in Section 7.2.
7. Emotional Response Dynamics in Continuous Time
Scale
In the previous Sections a discrete-time model has been de-
veloped for the evaluation of an emotional response in the
presence of discrete time trials. In real word conditions, how-
ever, an emotional source might elicit continuously a subject
in a certain time interval, so that the inter-trial interval T and
the single discrete trial duration 4T tend to zero (in other
words, a continuous elicitation can be seen as a series of an in-
finite number of discrete active elicitations, each of which has
an infinitesimal time duration 4T and the temporal spacing
between them tends to zero) . In these conditions, the emo-
tional response during the source-subject interaction cannot
be deemed constant and the dynamics of the response varia-
tion have to be carefully assessed. Moreover, the reactive re-
sponse is continuosly updated driven by the continuous time
counterpart of the error signal. In the following, the prob-
lem of developing a mathematical model for describing the
continuous time evolution of an emotional response is inves-
tigated, in order to extend our previous findings to the contin-
uous time scale. In principle, the theory of time scale calculus
[157] should be applied to the considered problem in order to
devise a solution independent of the involved time scale. In
our analysis, however, a simpler approach, based on standard
engineering methods, is developed.
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Figure 5: Representation of the reactive inhibitory response iRi, associated with a conditioned inhibitor CSi (which is encoded by the emotional system as a
source of stmulation rather than as a conditioned stimulus), over the expected excitatory outcome. In case a) the reactive inhibition associated with CSi is
effective on all the expected excitatory responses greater than zero, since, during inhibitory conditioning, the emotional system learned that the CSi is able
to completely inhibit the excitatory response. In case b) the reactive inhibition associated with CSi is not effective for expected excitatory responses smaller
than the value given by X−4X ; this is due to the fact that the emotional system has learned, during conditioning inhibition, that excitatory intensities smaller
than X −4X represent a residual response which cannot be inhibited. In both cases, a) and b), if the expected excitatory outcome is greater than X , which
represents the greatest expected excitatory intensity generated during inhibitory conditioning, the iRi coincides with the inhibitory intensity associated with
X ; this is due to the fact that the emotional system has not been trained for values higher than X .
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7.1. A continuous time model for emotional dynamic learning
To begin, we consider the proposed discrete-time model
(see Eqs. (23-25) and, without any loss of generality, we fo-
cus on the model not accounting for the response decay over
time nor for the contrast effect (the contrast effect will be dis-
cussed in Section 7.2; moreover, from a quantitative perspec-
tive the effects of the exponential decay can be accounted for
increasing the value of the parameter α). The so-called bilin-
ear transform method [208] is applied to this model in order
to derive a continuous time counterpart of it. It is not difficult
to prove that this results in the differential equation
y′(t) = x(t) · 2T ·(1+α) + x′(t) · 11+α − y(t) · 2·(1−α)T ·(1+α) (68)
which describes the desired continuous dynamic model. In
Eq. (68) the functions y(t), y′(t), x(t) and x′(t) represent the
elicited response, its first derivative, the active stimulation and
its first derivative over time, respectively; the parameter T ,
which represents the ITI in the discrete time scale, in the con-
tinuous time scale model represents the sensory time discrim-
ination threshold [209] (i.e., the smallest temporal interval for
which the CNS neurons can discriminate between two distinct
consecutive stimulations).1 Hence, the value of T depends on
the involved perceptive modality (e.g., somatosensory stimu-
lation, visual stimulation or acoustic stimulation).
If the condition yn = yn−1 (see Eq. (25)) is taken into ac-
count, solving this equation by standard methods produces
y(t) = exp
(
2(α−1)
T (1+α) t
)(
4·α
T (α+1)2
´ t
0 exp
(
− 2(α−1)T (1+α)τ
)
x(τ)dτ
+ x(t)α+1 exp
(
− 2(α−1)T (1+α) t
))
−exp
(
2(α−1)
T (1+α) t
)
x(0)
α+1
(69)
with
y(t) = y(t∗) if y′(t∗) = 0 and x(t) = x(t∗)∀t ≥ t∗ (70)
and
y(t) = y(t∗) if y′(t∗) = 0 and x(t) = 0∀t ≥ t∗. (71)
Note that Eq. (70) represents the continuous time counter-
part of yn = yn−1 (see Eq. (25)). In fact, the condition
yn−yn−1 = 0 turns into the differential condition y′(t∗) = 0 in
the continuous time domain. Therefore, Eq. (70) means that
the emotional reactive response is not updated if the the first
derivative of the response itself is equal to zero at a generic
1Note that, generally speaking, the excitation decay between one stimu-
lation and the successive one is not negligible and the α parameter increases
as T decreases (see Section 3.4). Whenever the value of the parameter T is
experimentally estimated, the associated value of the parameter α has also to
be estimated and employed in the continuous time equations (the estimation
of a vector α is required if multiple emotional components are elicited).
time instant t∗; consequently, the response at an instant t ≥ t∗
equals the response at the instant t∗, provided that the active
response x(t) remains constant in the time interval (t, t∗). In
practice, however, it should be expected that x(t) is a time
varying excitation, so that the response will experience con-
tinuous changes. A simple interpretation can be also provided
for Eq. (71). In fact, this refers to the case in which both
the first derivative of the response and the active response are
equal to zero at the istant t = t∗. In this case, the response
will take on the constant value y(t∗) for t ≥ t∗ in the absence
of an active elicitation (i.e. if x(t) = 0,∀t > t∗); this means
the resulting response will be purely reactive. In practice, it
should be expected that, if y′(t∗)< ε and x(t∗)< κ , where ε
κ are small quantities, the response y(t) will remain approxi-
mately constant over a certain time interval. Moreover, if the
active response x(t) becomes greater than zero at the instant
t = t∗ when the condition expressed by Eq. (71) holds, it is
not difficult to prove that the response can be expressed as
y(t) = y1+ y2(t) (72)
for t ≥ t∗, where
y1(t) = y(t∗) (73)
and
y2(t) = e
(
2(α−1)(t−t∗)
T (1+α)
)(
4·α·
T (α+1)2
´ t
t∗ e
(
2(α−1)
T (1+α) τ
)
x(τ)dτ
+ x(t)α+1 e
(
− 2(α−1)T (1+α) (t−t∗)
)) (74)
The last result shows that the response y(t) can considered
as the sum of two separate contributions, one representing the
inextinguishable reactive response (y1), the other one (y2(t))
accounting for the possible variations of the physical (active)
elicited response x(t). It is also important to point out that,
if the condition y′(t+) = 0 and x(t+) = 0 occurs again at a
successive instant t = t+, a new purely reactive response is
elicited and the model (72) can be adopted to represent it.
Therefore, our mathematical model leads to the conclusion
that an inextinguishable2 reactive response to a given source
of stimulation (e.g., an electric shock source or an acoustic
noise source) can be obtained through a suitable choice of the
dynamics of an induced active response and that, in principle,
this emotional reaction could be indefinitely strenghtened by
repeating similar dynamics.
Note also that, in order to obtain a reactive resistant-to-
extinction response, the dynamics of the active emotional re-
sponse x(t) have to meet specific conditions, which, in turn,
depend on the dynamics of the physical features (e.g., electric
voltage, frequency and amplitude of a noise sound, etc.) of
the adopted source. In other words, it should be expected that
a specific mapping function between the features of a given
2The adjective inextinguishable is employed to indicate that the source of
stimulation cannot be extinguished through simple repetitive expousures.
31
physical source and the corresponding active emotional re-
sponse induced by it exists. If this function is known, the
physical features of the source can be controlled in a way to
generate specific dynamics in the active response; this, in turn,
results in the generation of an inextinguishable form of emo-
tional reactive response. Therefore, these theoretical findings
suggest that, in principle, the inertial nature of the emotional
dynamic system can be exploited to originate a resistant-to-
extinction emotional reaction.
It is worth mentioning that the asymptotic response which
is obtained from the Eq. (69) assuming T = 1 and a costant
active elicitation (i.e., x(t) = X) is y = X/(1+α). This last
result shows that if a continuous active and constant elicita-
tion occurs over time, the overall response reaches the same
asymptotic value which is reached in the discrete-time model
during successive trials (see Eq.(29)).
Finally, it is worth mentioning that an “hybrid” time scale
should be adopted, in some cases, in real world; for instance
we could have different discrete trials, each of which is suffi-
ciently extended over time so that the continuous time model
should be used to analyse it (note that this type of time scale is
indicated by P in [157]). In this case both the discrete model
and the continuous time model have to be employed to de-
scribe the dynamics of emotional learning.
7.2. On the inclusion of contrast effects in the proposed con-
tinuous time emotional model
In the case of a continuous time source of stimulation (e.g.,
a continuous acoustic stimulation, such as music) contrast ef-
fects can be exploited to evoke specific emotional responses.
It is well known that music is able to evoke emotions, for in-
stance, violating expectations or shifting in time the rewards
in a balanced mechanism based on frustration (i.e., tension,
as a state of dissonance, instability and uncertainty [207]) and
satisfaction (resolution towards consonant and stable sounds
experienced as pleasurable) [66]. Violation or retardation in
resolution produces a tension increase which may result in
a successive stronger satisfaction during resolution [207]. In
this scenario, the contrast effect can explain, for instance, why
a slowly increasing tension could result in a successive higher
pleasure and rewarding effect after a sudden and unexpected
resolution. A qualitative description of the contrast effect on
a continuous time scale is expressed in Berlyne’s “arousal
jag” theory [206], which postulates that a drop from unusu-
ally high level of arousal (which is experienced as unpleasant)
to a low level is associated with a feeling of pleasure [207].
Apparently, the low level arousal alone is not able to elicit a
pleasure response; this means that only the contrast between
arousal levels produces an emotional pleasure (i.e., a contrast
effect). These considerations motivate our interest in includ-
ing the contrast effect in our continuous-time dynamic model
for the emotional system. Unluckily, the discrete-time coun-
terpart described in the Section 3.5 is nonlinear; consequently,
the procedure adopted in the derivation of Eq. (68) cannot be
applied to this case. Hence, the contrast effect on a continuous
time scale can be analysed by numerical simulation. A less
refined approach is based on linearizing the function C(eA;T )
(see Eq.(42)) and applying the bilinear transform method to
derive a new differential equation. In particular, if the Eq.
(43) is adopted for the modeling of the contrast effect (and as-
suming that 0<K < 1), the bilinear transform method applied
to Eq. (45) leads to the following differential equation
y′(t) = x(t) · 2(1+K)T ·(1+α+Kα−K) + x′(t) · 1+K1+α+Kα−K+
−y(t) · 2·(1−α−Kα+K)T ·(1+α+Kα−K)
(75)
The solution of the last equation is not reported here for
the sake of brevity. Finally, it is important to mention that the
contrast effect on a continuous time scale represents a further
tool that can be exploited to obtain a desired dynamics for an
emotional reactive response (e.g., for the elicitation of posi-
tive/negative emotional responses, or to obtain a resistant-to-
extinction response exploiting the dynamics in a continuous
time scale).
8. Resistant-to-extinction emotional reaction through re-
sponse saturation
Generally speaking, any mathematical function f (x) rep-
resenting a specific biological response cannot take on arbi-
trarily large values, because of the limited dynamics of the
response itself. In practice, as the value taken on by the ar-
gument x grows, the corresponding value f (x) of the func-
tion does not steadily increase in proportion to it and, when
x crosses a certain threshold, a certain saturation level is
reached; in other words, f (x) exhibits a nonlinear behavior
for sufficiently large values of x. In particular, these consider-
ations hold for the system chain function FCh(x) defined in our
dynamic model (see Eq. (18)) and involved in the computa-
tion of the emotional reaction, and for the amygdala function
FA(x) (see Eq. (10)). In the following, we focus on the sec-
ond function and analyse the implications of its nonlinear be-
hevior; similar considerations, however, can be expressed for
the system chain function. In developing our model of UCS
revaluation (see Section 3), we have assumed that FA(x) can
be approximated as a linear function (see Eq. (19)) if in the
n-th trial (or at a specific time instant) the error signal takes on
a value smaller than a saturation threshold TS, which defines
the linearization range for FA(x) (see Fig. 6).
If, however, the error signal exceeds the saturation thresh-
old TS (i.e., if the error signal becomes excessively large),
a phenomenon of emotional saturation should be expected.
This phenomenon could occur during an extremely traumatic
event, represented by a unique event over a continuous time
scale (see Section 7), or by an event involving successive ac-
quisition trials and stimulations on a discrete time scale (see
Section 3). It is worth noting, for instance, that if during a
continuous-time active elicitation the reactivity of the amyg-
dala is relatively high (which could be increased by the stress
hormones and other factors related to stress [161]), the pa-
rameter α increases accordingly (see Eqs. (19-21), so that
the reached asymptotic response, which can be expressed as
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y= X/(1−α) (see Eq. (29) and Section 7.1) could grow until
several times the intensity of the active elicitation X (for in-
stance if α = 0.9 then y = 10 ·X). It is also worth to mention
that a purely reactive response could grow until a saturation
level in the absence of any active stimulations, for instance
through the so called “social learning of fear” [189, 188].
When emotional saturation occurs, the source of stimulation
(or any associated cue) generating it could produce inextin-
guishable effects, even in the absence of an active component
(which corresponds to the term X in eq. (18)). In fact, in the
linear case, a purely reactive elicitation in the absence of an
active component (i.e., with X = 0) leads to a negative error
signal, since an active component is expected. In turn this
error signal weakens the amygdala response (i.e., more pre-
cisely it produces a reduction by the amount −γ ·X ; see Eqs.
(10, 19)), and hence leads to the extinction through successive
trials (see Eq. (36)). Conversely, if the amygdala function has
previously reached its saturation level, in the first trial of re-
active elicitation in the absence of the active component (e.g.,
a purely reactive visual or auditory cue triggers the reactive
emotional response associated with the considered traumatic
event) the computed negative error signal is unable to reduce
the amygdala response. Hence, in the successive trials the er-
ror signal becomes equal to zero and no response updating
occurs. More specifically, this is true if the error signal com-
puted in the first trial, whose amplitude is equal to that of the
expected active component (i.e., e1 =−X), is smaller than the
saturation level reached by the amygdala function (see Fig. 6).
These considerations lead us to the conclusion that any stim-
ulus perception, even in the absence of an active elicitation,
can trigger a reactive emotional response. This holds both for
the perception of the source of stimulation and for any related
cue; in fact, a cue (CS) conditioned to the source (UCS) can
trigger the reactive response associated with the UCS (i.e.,
iR), and since such a response is evident and constant at ev-
ery trial (i.e., the error signal is equal to zero) the contingency
between CS and the UCR (iR) is reinforced at every trial. Fur-
thermore, the considerations made in the Section 6.4.2 about
a cue conditioned to a purely reactive source of stimulation
apply to this case too. We argue that this phenomenon could
happen in panic disorders and PTSD [68, 69, 70]. As a matter
of fact, in some forms of PTSD and panic disorders the mere
repetitive exposure to cues related to a traumatic event does
not lead to an extinction of emotional responses or results in
a very slow extinction [210, 70, 211]. It is worth noting that
during the reactive stimulation (e.g., a panic attack) other pre-
viously neutral cues could be associated (i.e., conditioned or
misattributed) to the occuring reactive response, and succes-
sively these cues might trigger the reactive response; hence,
in turn, this phenomenon can lead to a generalization of trig-
gered panic attacks (i.e., panic disorders). Note that the stan-
dard classical conditioning model is unable able to explain
these psychopathologies. Nevertheless, one might argue that
in PTSD patients the traumatic stimulus is generally perceived
in a context (and also in the presence of boundary conditions)
that differ from the one which originally caused the emotional
response saturation. Hence, the different perceived context
should lead to an (at least partial) inhibition of the elicited re-
active response. Nonetheless, it should be kept into account
that: a) the inhibitory strength originating from the discrimi-
nation of the contextual information could be smaller than the
degree of saturation reached by the amygdala response dur-
ing the considered traumatic event (see Fig. 6); b) contextual
information are primarily coded and stored in the hippocam-
pus (conversely, the representation of an aversive stimulus is
coded within the BLA), so that, if during the traumatic event
the hippocampus does not properly code contextual informa-
tion, then no effective contextual discrimination can be ob-
tained during further expousures of the stimulus. As far as this
last point is concerned, it is worth mentioning that hippocam-
pus functioning and its ability to encode information (espe-
cially contextual information) are impaired by uncontrollable
stress (see [161] for a review on this topic). In particular, it
is well known that the hippocampus of a mammalian brain
is a target of stress hormones since it has one of the highest
concentrations of receptors for corticosteroids. Consequently,
certain hippocampal functions, such as learning and mem-
ory, are susceptible to disruption by stress partly mediated by
corticosteroid receptors (mainly by the glucocorticoid recep-
tors, GRs). Interestingly, the model developed in [161] shows
that alterations in hippocampal functioning require both stress
hormones and the active output from the amygdala, which in
turn projects both directly and indirectly to the hippocampus.
For this reason, the amygdala output is a crucial component
on the stress-induced modulation of hippocampal plasticity;
in fact, when there is an experimentally induced reduction in
the amygdalar input to the hippocampus (as a result of an in-
activation or damage of the amygdala), plasticity in the hip-
pocampus remains intact under stress conditions [161]. These
results support our hypothesis according to which the satura-
tion of the amygdala response during an extreme traumatic
event, together with the release of the stress hormones, could
lead to an impairment of the hippocampus functioning and
contextual information encoding. In parallel, the saturation of
an emotional response component could cancel the effect of
the error signal, which, on the contrary, in physiological con-
ditions should produce an extinguishment of the emotional
response in few trials.
It is also worth mentioning that cronic stress (e.g., PTSD)
may induces hippocampus atrophy [212] and impair neuroge-
nesis, specifically in the DG [161]. This, in turn, may lead
to a greater generalization of anxiety disorders, in the impair-
ment of emotional reactions inhibition and of contextual cue
processing [211].
8.1. On the reactive response to a stimulus under drug ad-
ministration
The proposed dynamic model can be also exploited to anal-
yse the emotional response over multiple trials when a reac-
tive (and resistant-to-extinction) response is contrasted by an
active drug treatment (e.g., an anxiolytic drug is employed to
lower an anxiety reaction or panic attack elicited by a given
33
Error Signal 
Error Signal 
Saturation 
Saturation 
TS 
TS 
( a ) 
( b ) 
 1nA eF
)()( 1 XFeF AnA 
xee nn  1 1ne
)(eFA
XXFA  )(
1nexee nn  1
x
x
)()( 1 nAnA eFeF 
)(eFA
Figure 6: Schematic representation of the biological behavior of the amygdala function FA(x) in its linear zone a) and in its saturation zone b). In case a) the
error signal (equal to −x) is able to reduce the elicited emotional response. On the contrary, in case b) a negative error signal is unable to produce a similar
effect, so that the emotional response remains at its saturation level. In particular, the case b) occurs if the negative error signal (due, for instance, to the
fact that the active response x is no more elicited during the stimulation) is smaller than the degree of saturation reached by the amygdala in the previous
stimulation(s).
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stimulus). Our interest in this analysis is motivated by the pos-
sibility of quantitatively assessing the long term mitigation of
an undesired pathological emotional reaction provided that it
is administered an active drug during the elicitation of a reac-
tive response; in particular, we are interested in analysing the
effects of the drug withdrawal.
One might argue that, in the considered scenario, the mere
exposition to the source stimulus during the administration of
a suitable drug could be effective in reducing or extinguishing
an undesired pathological reactive response, such as those oc-
curring in panic attacks, PTSD or phobias. Indeed, as shown
in Section 3, if a negative error signal (due to a response re-
duction) is computed during a trial expousure, the reactive
response is modified accordingly, and this results in a less in-
tense emotional reaction. Nonetheless, it can be shown that,
after the trial in which the drug administration is suspendend,
the reactive response asymptotically increases to its original
value, that is to the value of the response occuring before the
trial in which drug was administred. In fact, this result is due
to the computed error signal and holds in the absence of any
cognitive modulation of the reactive response (i.e., in the ab-
sence of emotional reappraisal [213]).
In our study of a reactive response contrasted by an active
drug treatment it is assumed that a given stimulus produces an
inextinguishable reactive response iR = Y0. Such a response
could originate from different events, like response saturation
during a traumatic event (see Section 8) or repetitive energiz-
ing trials of a reactive response through an accumulation ef-
fect (see Section 4.1), or it can be natively stored within the
amygdala [90, 2] (e.g., arachnophobia). For this reason, the
initial condition
y0 = Y0 (76)
is given. In the sequence of trials the effect of the adminis-
tered drug is always represented by an active elicitation, de-
noted A = −4Y0, opposite to the reactive response (i.e., the
active drug effect consists of an inhibition of the reactive re-
sponse). Then, from Eq. (3) it is easily inferred that
y1 = iR+A1 = Y0−4Y0; (77)
so that the error signal computed in the first trial is
e1 , y1− y0 =−4Y0. (78)
Note that the active drug (represented by the term−4Y0 in the
last equation) should inhibit the reactive response y, which is
expected to became weaker (i.e, should be obtained y1 ' 0).
Furthermore, if the drug withdrawal starts in the second trial,
the resulting response y2 can be expressed as (see Eq. 23)
y2 = Y0+α · e1
= Y0−α ·4Y0, (79)
so that the resulting error signal is
e2 , y2− y1
= (1−α) ·4Y0. (80)
Consequently, the response in the third trial is
y3 = iR+α · e1+α · e2
= Y0−α2 ·4Y0. (81)
Following this line of reasoning, the response elicited in n-th
trial (with n≥ 2) can be expressed as
yn = Y0−αn−1 ·4Y0 (82)
The last equation can be also derived from the mathemati-
cal model developed for the case of a phylogenetic source of
stimulation, that is from Eq. (32) (a phylogenetic stimulus
is conceptually different from an undesired reactive response
acquired through emotional learning, but the emotional re-
sponses appearing in these two cases are functionally iden-
tical). Moreover, from Eq. (82) it is easily inferred that, after
drug withdrawal, the emotional response asymptotically tends
to its initial value (Y0) as the number of trials increases (since
the inequality |α|< 1 holds). This result confirms that an ac-
tive response (e.g., the effect of an active drug) can certainly
mitigate a reactive one; however, it also shows that, if the ac-
tive response vanishes (i.e., if the drug is withdrawn in this
case), the error signal becomes positive, since the actual out-
come is greater than the expected counterpart, and the reactive
response progressively returns to its initial value. Note also
that an active drug can exert its inhibition effect also through
a reduction of the amygdala reactivity (i.e., a reduction of the
parameter γ derived from the amygdala function FA(x); see
Eqs. (10, 19)) and, consequently, of the α parameter. How-
ever, it is easy to show that the mathematical result derived
above also applies to this case if it is assumed that the amyg-
dala reactivity (i.e., the behavior of FA(x)) returns to its orig-
inal conditions after the drug withdrawal (actually, a time in-
variant behavior of the amygdala function has been previously
assumed to simplify the development of our model).
Unlike the case of an active drug treatment, if an undesired
reactive response (target response) is counteracted through an
opposite reactive elicitation (e.g., through a reactive inhibi-
tion), then the effect of the counteraction will be permanent,
since no active component is expected. Hence, ideally, a reac-
tive counteraction will be learned and permanently sustained
by the emotional learning system; on the contrary, an ac-
tive counteraction needs the presence of an active response
at every trial. For instance, psychotherapy and behavioral
treatments could be effective inhibitors of a reactive response
since they are able to modulate (e.g., reduce) a reactive re-
sponse within the amygdala through cognitive manipulations.
This is due to the fact that the human dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (DLPC) is able to direct higher level cognitive informa-
tion, such as “self regulation thoughts”, to the OFC, which, in
turn, can integrate these information and modulate the origi-
nal emotional reaction stored within the amygdala (so that a
reappraisal effect is obtained) [213, 214, 146, 145]. In sum-
mary, a conscious down-regulation of emotions [213] allows
to generate an error signal able to mitigate a reactive response
without requiring an external active source, like a drug.
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From a mathematical viewpoint, our last considerations can
be motivated as follows. The reappraisal (e.g., reduction) of
the reactive response of the amygdala by a quantity−4Y ′0/α
through OFC modulation results in the response
y1 = Y0−4Y ′0, (83)
so that the error signal computed in the first trial is
e1 , y1− y0 =−4Y ′0. (84)
Hence, if it is assumed that no further session of cognitive
reappraisal occurs, the response in the second trial can be ex-
pressed as
y2 = Y0−4Y ′0 +α · e1
= Y0−4Y ′0−α ·4Y
′
0,
(85)
Note the last equation still contains the term −4Y ′0, since it
originates directly from a reactive emotional downregulation
(and it is not due to the computation of an error signal after
that an active elicitation has been occured, like in the previ-
ous case; see Eq. (77)). Such a reduction can be obtained, for
instance, by lowering the amygdala reactivity during the re-
sponse (e.g., by reducing the release of stress hormones, since
these are known to affect the amygdala output; [161]); more-
over, multiple sessions of reactive modulation could lead to
the extinction of the considered reactive response. Note also
that, in the absence of additional sessions of emotional mod-
ulation, the asymptotic response can be expressed as
y∞ = Y0− 4Y
′
0
1−α (86)
and this shows that the effect of the reactive inhibition persists
over successive trials.
8.2. Drug treatments, reactive methods and emotional re-
sponses
Since pathologies involving emotional disorders, such as
panic disorders or PTSD, usually lead to a generalization of
their triggered responses (i.e., an increased number of new
stimuli becomes able to trigger a pathological reactive re-
sponse) and to the atrophy or impaired neurogenesis of the
hippocampus (in particular, of the DG) [161], specific phar-
macological treatments could be effective in blocking and re-
versing these biological conditions. Nevertheless, as shown
in the previous Section, a treatment based on an active drug
alone could be unable to counteract the pathological reactive
response on a long term (i.e., after the drug withdrawal). This
means that active drugs, even if are able to mitigate the symp-
toms due to strong inextinguishable responses, cannot durably
extinguish them. For this reason, the adoption of reactive
methods (e.g., psychotherapy treatments [215, 210]) able to
extinguish (or mitigate) a pathological reactive response is
required. These methods include all the techniques able to
counteract a pathological emotional response through an op-
posite reactive response or a reactive inhibition (consequently,
the use of any active component is avoided). We argue that
different technologies, like optogenetic manipulation of mem-
ory engrams and memory photostimulation, could be adopted
to achieve this target. In fact, on the one hand, the optogenetic
manipulation of the memory engrams within the DG or the
BLA [54, 216, 55] allows to switch the valence of a CS in the
DG from a positive (negative) UCS to an opposite one [55].
Some results have evidenced that the chronic reactivation of
hippocampal cells associated with a positive memory is able
to suppress depression-like behavior in mice [216]. On the
other hand, the memory photostimulation of UCS-responsive
cells on the BLA has been shown to produce valence-specific
behaviors [54]. On the basis of the aforementioned results we
argue that, if during trials in which a subject is exposed to
the cues related to a traumatic event, positive valenced UCS-
responsive cells were photostimulated, then the outcome trig-
gered by such cues (i.e., the target response) could be weak-
ened. In fact, the photostimulation-induced response should
be misattributed to the target cue and, consequently, the fi-
nal cue-related outcome should be due to the superposition
of the original target response with the optically elicited re-
sponse; this should result in a net decrease of the target re-
sponse. Unluckily, optogenetic neuronal manipulations and
memory photostimulation cannot be used on humans today
because of their invasiveness. We argue, however, that similar
reactive counteractions could be obtained through a sublimi-
nal expousure, exploiting the implicit accumulation effect (see
Section 4.1). Finally, it is useful to mention that techniques
exploiting the misattribution of reactive responses (both con-
ditioned responses and purely reactive responses) could be
also employed to strengthen a desired response (e.g., an un-
conscious placebo response).
Discussion
In this manuscript a novel theory of emotional learning has
been illustrated. The theory shows the differentiation (and the
relations) between classical conditioning and the UCS reval-
uation, and provides various new insights on well known psy-
chophysiological phenomena and psychiatric diseases (e.g.,
panic disorders and PTSD), and a number of new ideas for
further research. One of its most interesting implications is
represented by the identification of well defined mathemat-
ical and neurophysiological conditions ensuring the inextin-
guishability of specific emotional reactions. In particular,
it allows us to establish the following four different mecha-
nisms through which a stimulus can produce a resistant-to-
extinction emotional reaction: 1) misattribution of a reactive
response (see Corollary 1); 2) classical conditioning of a stim-
ulus to a purely reactive source of stimulation; 3) saturation of
emotional response (e.g., of the amygdala reactive response);
4) the exploitation of the inertial dynamics of emotional learn-
ing system on a continuous time scale. Further relevant contri-
butions are represented by the proof that the Rescorla-Wagner
model for classical conditioning can be obtained as a special
case of the proposed model; the derivation of a new model for
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conditioning, which accounts for the implicit UCS revaluation
and that is able to quantitatively describe important experi-
mental results (such as the impossibility to extinguish a con-
ditioned inhibitor through its repeated presentations), which
are unpredictable by existing classical conditioning models.
Indeed, classical conditioning has been deeply studied in the
last century, while UCS revaluation did not obtain the due at-
tention, and, for this reason, actually, appropriate analytical
and experimental models for resistant-to-extinction responses
do not exist.
Our result paves the way for various new research activ-
ities. First of all, various potential applications of our the-
ory can be envisaged in the hot research area concerning the
manipulation of human behaviours and emotional reactions.
Note that our theory unveils the real differences between an
UCS and a CS from the perspective of the emotional system
and, in particular, shows that removing a CS does not ensure
the extinction of an undesired emotional reaction, since, as
long as a UCS reaction remain stored (or relatively strength),
it is able to form other CS-UCS connections, or to duplicate
its associated reaction through a misattribution effect or even
to strenghten itself through incubation mechanisms. Further-
more, if an UCS reaction is extinguished or weakened, all the
associated CSs are weakened. Thus, establishing a well de-
fined differentiation between a cue (i.e., a CS) and a source
of stimulation (i.e., UCS) is fundamental in order to eradicate
an emotional undesired reaction. This fundamental differen-
tiation could be effectively assessed exploiting Remark (6),
i.e. testing the subliminal emotional reactive response through
subliminal exposure. Indeed, as shown in our analysis, no dif-
ference between CS and UCS might be sensed in the course
of a supraliminar perception. In addition, from a conscious
perspective, a source or a cue-stimulus could be hardly differ-
entiated, because of misattribution effects or response dupli-
cations (e.g., an initial CS could be misattributed and become
an UCS); note also these and other related attribution phenom-
ena often occur automatically and unconsciously [30, 34], and
are not explained by classical conditioning theory.
Another interesting research topic is represented by the po-
tential applications of Corollary 1, i.e. by the possibility of
devising UCSs able to elicitate reactive responses. Such re-
sponses could be strenghtened through an accumulation effect
and potentially exploited to modify the emotional reaction to
a given stimulus (e.g., to weaken an opposite valenced emo-
tional reaction or to enhance the unconscious placebo effect of
a drug [98, 99]). The idea of generating an accumulated reac-
tive response could be really useful from a therapeutic view-
point since, in practice, the active modulation of a given reac-
tive response (accomplished, for instance, through the action
of a pharmacological drug) vanishes over time if the associ-
ated active component decays too (in the considered example
this occurs if the administered drug is withdrawn). Further-
more, other “reactive methods” could be exploited in order to
modulate (i.e., to increase or decrease) a target response; these
methods include but are not limited to: the misattribution of
a CR forward the target response, the cognitive reappraisal
of an emotional response [213] (e.g., psychotherapy), optoge-
netic manipulations [54, 216, 55].
Once again, it is worth stressing that these results rely on
the differentation between the types of emotional response
(such as active, reactive and passive residual responses) that
can come into play during a stimulation (and, more precisely,
during UCS revaluation) and the concepts of source attribu-
tion and misattribution, and that these relevant factors are not
taken into consideration in classical conditioning models.
A further relevant research topic concerns the applications
of our model of emotional learning on a continuous time
scale. Generally speaking, this model could be exploited
to analyse the emotional reaction generated by any physical
stimulation which varies continuosly over time (e.g., a time-
varying acoustic source of stimulation, such as music [66]).
We feel, however, that our model is preliminary and that it
should be improved by including some features of hippocam-
pus filtering (for instance, the temporal pattern recognition,
that is the detection of regular patterns within the time-varying
elicited response, should be included).
Finally, it is important to mention that our theoretical
framework can be exploited for the development of psy-
chophysiological experimental models for both animals and
humans; these, in turn, can potentially provide new insights
into emotion-related phenomena and pathologies.
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Appendix
In this Appendix we describe an experiment useful to prove
that the encoding of an aversive object as a conditioned stim-
ulus (CS) to a primary source of punishment (i.e., CS-UCS
encoding through aversive classical conditioning acquisition)
or as a primary source of stimulation (UCS) involves different
regions of the mammalian brain.
The procedure adopted in this experiment is obtained by
including a new part in the procedure followed in [1] and is
sketched below. The proposed experiment is based on the use
of a specific device, never observed by the involved subjects
and having a neutral shape; this device, however, is able to
produce an aversive stimulus, like an electric shock or strong
noise. Morever, it involves two distinct groups of subjects,
one denoted group+, the other one group-. In practice, the
experiment consists of three different phases, each involv-
ing multiple trials. In the first phase the selected device has
to directly elicit an aversive response for some trials in the
members of group+, so that their emotional learning systems
attribute the elicited responses to that source of stimulation,
learn the associated reactive responses, and finally code and
store them within their amygdalas. In the group-, the same
device has to be conditioned to an identical aversive response
elicited in the group+; however, all the subjects of group-
must be aware of the fact that the aversive stimulus origi-
nates from another source of stimulation (denoted UCSa) and
must learn the stimulus contingencies (in other words, classi-
cal conditioning learning occurs for group-, instead of the di-
rect response attribution characterizing group+). In particular,
the picture of the new device pointed toward the subject can
be easily conditioned instead of the device itself (since, other-
wise, it would be quite difficult to perform a conditioning pro-
cedure by which the physical object is paired with the UCSa
elicitation). In the second phase, a differential conditioning
paradigm is adopted. For this reason, each subject of group+
has to be conditioned with the pairing of the picture of this de-
vice, pointed toward the subject and denoted CS+, with a new
UCS (e.g. and electric shock); the last UCS, called UCSb,
must be different from UCSa, that is employed for the con-
ditioning of group-. Moreover, another threatening element
(e.g., a gun), called CS-, is presented to the subjects of group+
in the absence of an UCS. The same procedure is followed
for the subjects of group-; these have previously acquired the
given device as a conditiond cue and not as a direct source
of stimulation. Finally, in the third phase, a masked (un-
masked) extinction phase for half subjects of group+ (group-)
will be able to reveal which CSs+ are able to elicit a differ-
ential autonomic response (i.e. a SCR) even under a sublim-
inally (masked) perception. If group+ only will exhibit a dif-
ferential autonomic response in the masked extinction (with
respect to the SCR elicited by the masked CS- perception), it
will be inferred that only the representation of the CS+ within
group+ can be activated through the sub-cortical thalamus-
amygdala pathway; therefore, we will come to the conclusion
that the the representation of CS+ has been stored within the
amygdala in the same site as other UCSs (e.g., phylogenetic or
ontogenetic threatening stimuli [162, 1, 2, 3, 90]) have been
stored (i.e., the BLA). Conversely, if the subjects of group-
are considered, the CS+ (which is the same picture as that
employed for group+), represents an aversive object which
has not been stored within the BLA, or, in any case, not in a
brain region activated by the sub-cortical thalamo-amygdala
pathway (like the phylogenetic or ontogenetic stimuli).
We believe that, if the envisaged results will be obtained,
they will also definitively prove that the mechanism through
which the selected aversive object has been encoded (i.e.,
through classical conditioning acquisition, or by direct or im-
plicit response attribution) makes the difference.
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